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Much of Sub-Saharan Africa economically and democratically lags behind the rest of 
the world. Many wealthy countries have worked to speed up Africa’s development through 
the use of foreign aid. The George W. Bush Administration utilized aid in their efforts to help 
eliminate poverty and deepen democracy. They disbursed aid through a novel government 
agency named the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). This thesis gauges the 
usefulness of the MCC and measures its impact on economic and democratic development in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. To provide an assessment of the MCC, I examine the association 
between foreign aid disbursed by the MCC and resulting economic and democratic 
development. The conclusions are drawn by employing a quantitative methodology using 
difference of means analysis and bivariate analysis. The empirical research suggests that aid 
disbursed through the MCC is producing only slight economic and democratic growth. I 
conclude the study with a case study that corroborates the empirical findings. This study 
brings into question the general effectiveness of foreign aid and further suggests that Africa 
may need another solution to underdevelopment that may go beyond the reach of aid planners.  






























INTRODUCTION & LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
“When nations close their markets and opportunity is hoarded by a privileged few, no 
amount—no amount—of development aid is ever enough. When nations respect their people, 
open markets, invest in better health and education, every dollar of aid, every dollar of trade 
revenue and domestic capital is used more effectively”  
 -- President George W. Bush 
 
1.1 The Problem 
Sub-Saharan Africa is simply undeveloped in comparison to much of the world. 
Plagued by poverty, disease, conflict and poor governance, sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has not 
participated in global economic and democratic growth to the same degree as other regions. 
The statistics are stunning showing that the absolute number of people below the $1-a-day 
poverty line has been steadily rising in recent years (Chen & Ravallion 2007). SSA’s lagging 
economic development and disappointing democratic record have resulted in strong calls for 
international assistance. Ardent efforts are being made by many wealthy countries to lift 
developing countries out of poverty and into prosperity. Similarly, strong democratic states 
have sought ways to produce and strengthen democracy throughout SSA. A popular means of 
support for development is through the use of foreign aid. In the past fifty years, over US $1 
trillion in development aid has been given by rich countries to African governments (Moyo 
2009). Have these enormous sums of aid resulted in an improved economic and democratic 
situation for Africa? In an effort to answer this question, this study addresses the intersection 
of foreign aid and development.   
 
In a world where globalization abounds, it is undeniable that development and politics 
are intricately connected. These two areas of study also intersect under the topic of aid. The 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) to SSA has nearly tripled since the year 2000. The 
United Nations, the World Bank, non-governmental organizations (NGO) and celebrities have 
prompted wealthy countries to dramatically increase the amount of aid they give to poor 
countries. And, it has worked by bringing ODA to its highest levels ever.  
 
During the George W. Bush Administration the United States intended for aid to assist 













The Bush Administration’s plans for development fall under the foreign policy plan dubbed 
the freedom agenda. The freedom agenda encompasses a number of policy initiatives, but its 
main tenants are democracy promotion, security maintenance and foreign assistance.
1
 Under 
the belief that a close correlation exists between economic development and growth in 
democracy, the Bush Administration made development through aid an important part the 
freedom agenda. This is evidenced by their tripling of humanitarian and development aid to 
the continent of Africa. They vowed to invest more than $9 billion dollars by 2010 (Fletcher 
2006). The United States' reasons for acting to reduce poverty are manifold; the meeting of 
people’s basic needs such as food, health care, education and nominal material comforts. Its 
work to promote and deepen democracy has its roots in the basic principle that freedom 
(through democratic governance) “is the right and the capacity of all mankind” as trumpeted 




Since 2004 the United States has shifted its overall strategy for aid implementation. 
The Bush Administration concluded that aid is most effective in reducing poverty and 
producing stronger democracies when it is given to responsible governments that are eager to 
liberalize their economies, improve their governance, and care for their citizens. The 
institution that the Bush Administration pioneered to administer aid accordingly was the 
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). The MCC is a United States government aid 
agency that rewards countries that govern justly, invest in their people and foster economic 
freedom. The responsibility for development is placed squarely on the developing country 
itself. While the MCC operates on a global scale, I will look to its work in SSA. Since its 
inception, the MCC has committed over $3.7 billion dollars to countries in SSA. Although 
massive amounts of aid are being administered through the MCC, few studies have examined 
its effectiveness in promoting development.     
 
In this thesis quantitative and qualitative methods are used to evaluate the MCC and 
its impact on development as measured by economic and democratic growth.  I ask three 
particular questions that are designed to deliver an empirical assessment of the MCC: 1) Is 
there a demonstrable link between the incentive of aid and development in SSA; 2) Is there a 
demonstrable link between the monitoring and evaluation of aid compacts and development in 
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 For an explanation of President Bush’s Freedom Agenda, see (http://www/georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/infoucs/freedomagenda) 
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SSA; and 3) Is there a demonstrable link between the size of the aid disbursement and 
development in SSA? For further elaboration, I expound on particular MCC activities through 
a case study and identify patterns and generalizations from which I reach two important 
conclusions: 1) The Bush Administration and the MCC used aid to strike a political balance 
between compassion and US economic interests and; 2) President Bush and the MCC used aid 
to create ideal governments and prepare poor countries for future development. 
 
The dependent variable of development will be operationalized by economic growth 
and democratic growth. The economic indicator of growth will be measured by change in 
GNI per capita. The change in Freedom House ratings of Political Rights and Civil Liberties 
will be used to measure democracy. These indicators are widely recognized as reliable 
measures of economic and democratic growth. 
 
1.2 Significance of the Study    
The MCC is a rarity among aid agencies. Its strict criteria and selectivity set it apart 
from other government agencies or NGOs that distribute aid according to need or on a 
conditional basis. Its novel approach to development is rooted in the notion that well 
governed, democratic states offer the best context in which aid can produce positive results. 
Only after a country meets the established criteria to the satisfaction of the MCC will it 
receive a development grant worth unfettered millions of dollars. Without liberal economic 
policies and a commitment to democracy, countries need not apply. While this approach to 
foreign aid is not new from a theoretical perspective, the MCC is one of the first aid agencies 
to actually distribute aid according to this paradigm. Furthermore, relatively very little 
research has been conducted on aid's impact on democracy within a state. This year, the MCC 
reaches its fifth anniversary. The anniversary provides a good opportunity to give an initial 
assessment of the MCC’s progress in achieving development in SSA. 
 
1.3 Literature Review 
The political science and economic literature on aid and development is expansive. 
The literature reviewed here will highlight a set of literature regarding the impacts of aid 
followed by a set of literature identifying obstacles to development. I will begin with a brief 














Many proponents of aid argue that it is justified chiefly on moral grounds. It is argued 
that it is responsibility of the wealthy to give money to lesser-developed countries. The 
Kennedy Administration established the moral case for aid during the cold war era when 
President Kennedy said, “We pledge our best efforts to help them (the poor) to help 
themselves, ...not because the Communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, 
but because it is right”(Riddel 1987). Politicians push their legislatures for more aid funding 
calling it a moral imperative and the “opportunity and challenge of our generation” (Easterly 
2006), while rock stars popularize aid and ask, “Do we have the will to make poverty 
history?” (Bastable 2005). In this case, the appeal for aid is based on the principles of 
morality and altruism. Others argue the case for aid to compensate countries that are at a 
perceived disadvantage due to capitalism, trade or globalization. John Rawls contractual 
theory of justice suggests that economic inequalities should be arranged so that they are “to 
the greatest benefit of the least advantaged” (Rawls 1973). Rawls would advocate aid, or 
redistribution of wealth through direct monetary transfers between states, as a fair and 
reasonable way to give individuals in poor countries, what Rawls termed their “right to 
resources” (Riddel 1987).  
 
In addition to aid simply being the right thing to do, proponents advocate that aid is 
indispensable for the development of poor and democratically unconsolidated countries.  The 
world’s poorest countries can only escape their circumstances with the help of the wealthy. 
The costs of infrastructure are too great and the capital needs are too large for a developing 
economy to mature on its own. Power, communications, port facilities, roads and other pieces 
of national infrastructure “set the framework” for making economic activity possible (Krauss 
1984). The well-known Harvard economist, Jeffery Sachs, describes aid as essential to 
helping the world’s poorest onto the first rung of the economic ladder.  Aid proponents insist 
that large sums of capital are needed to increase participation of private capital in the 
development process. 
 
However, while opponents of aid do not doubt the motivation for aid or the need for 
capital; they question aid's effectiveness in promoting national development. Most empirical 
analyses on the effectiveness of aid can be categorized as belonging to one of two groups - aid 
optimists or aid pessimists. Overall development is a common goal between both groups. 
Ending hunger, improving education, building infrastructure and achieving economic 













goals differently.  
 
1.3.1 Aid Pessimists 
At its core, foreign aid is a discussion about the principle of government intervention 
in economic matters. John Stuart Mill advocates governmental restraint in matters of the 
economy when he writes, “the great majority of things are worse done by the intervention of 
government”. He continues by writing, “...people understand their own business and their own 
interests better, and care for them more, than the government does, or can be expected to do” 
(Mill 1994).  This follows that aid is ineffective because economies cannot be centrally 
planned. Markets are made up of millions of individuals each making decisions that they 
believe are in their best interests. For the same reason that Adam Smith's invisible hand of 
self-interest makes a free market successful, economic planner’s distribution of aid will also 
be unsuccessful. Because economies are complex and multi-faceted, economic controls tend 
to obstruct progress rather than resulting in economic advances. Therefore, critics suggest that 
aid fails for the same reasons that other centrally planned economies have failed in the past.  
 
Possibly an aid pessimist strongest argument is that aid is not effective in producing 
economic growth. They claim that wealthy, good intentioned countries ultimately have little to 
show for their efforts and expenditures.  Figure 1 shows the correlation William Easterly 
found between aid and growth. Easterly found that an increase in aid negatively impacts 
economic growth (Easterly 2006). With the understanding that most foreign aid expenditures 
have not performed well in the latter part of the 20th century, scholars and economists have 













Figure 1: Aid and Growth in Africa (10-year moving averages) (Easterly 2003) 
             
 
1.3.2 Aid Optimists and Aid Effectiveness  
A significant amount of recent research has studied the impact of aid on countries with 
good governance. Governance can be defined as “a set of values, policies and institutions by 
which a society manages its economic, political, and social processes at all levels through 
interaction among government, civil society, and private sector” (Cheema 2000). Governance 
is a complex concept with many components. One of the most important components is that 
of the role that institutions play in encouraging growth and strengthening democracy. I look to 
the work of Stephen Kosack (2003), Douglas North (1990), and Francis Fukuyama (2004) to 
make sense of the use of institutions to encourage growth and deepen democracy. This 
literature provides relevance to the MCC’s use of aid to build institutions.  
 
Kosack finds that aid is more effective when combined with efforts to encourage 
democratization – a model that the MCC has followed implicitly. More particularly, he finds a 
positive and highly significant relationship between aid and quality of life (using the Human 
Development Index as a measurement of quality) when the recipient country is democratic. Is 
the prevalence of democracy the key to making the best use of aid in terms of development – 
both economic and democratic? Douglas North's primary claim is that institutions or 
institutional change can affect the performance of economies. North further suggests that 
institutions structure incentives in human exchange whether political, social or economic. His 













democracy. Fukuyama suggests that strengthening a states ability to plan and execute policies, 
maintain transparency and enforce laws is paramount for a developing economy or fledgling 
democracy. For example, the MCC's aid to Benin, in large part focuses on strengthening the 
system of justice aiming to improve arbitration, mediation and conciliation. In Ghana and 
Mozambique, the MCC is working to strengthen the policy and regulatory framework of the 
government agencies responsible for land control ensuring more efficient and secure access to 
land. In all these cases the MCC emphasized the importance in institutions in achieving 
economic and democratic growth.  
 
A litany of studies has tested the impact of aid on economic growth and democracy. 
Economic studies have tested aid's ability to attract investment (Rosenstein-Rodan 1961), 
generate economic growth (Burnside & Dollar 2000), and provide capital (Youngson 1987). 
Scholars have searched for political phenomena linked to aid, such as various correlations 
between aid and democracy (Finkel et al. 2006), (Djankov et al. 2006), (Svennson 1999), 
governance (Hansen & Tarp 2000) and quality of life (Kosack 2003). For purposes of this 
thesis, particular attention will be given to literature surrounding the correlation between aid 
and economic growth and aid and the strengthening of democracy within a state.  
 
The idea that aid works more effectively in achieving economic growth when 
provided to states with liberal economic policies and healthy governance was initially 
propagated by a study conducted by Craig Burnside and David Dollar.  Their study provided a 
new model for measuring aid effectiveness by searching for a correlation between foreign aid 
and growth rates in developing states.  This correlation has been tested before; however, 
Burnside and Dollar tested aid recipients that had good policies (defined by things such as low 
budget deficits, free trade policies, and low levels of corruption) and bad policies. The 
economists found that if wealthy countries are “selective” when choosing countries to give aid 
to and select only countries with quality institutions, they yield better results (Burnside & 
















                 Figure 2: Per Capita GDP Growth in Low Income Countries with Good Policies (Burnside & Dollar, 2000) 
 
 
Since the Burnside and Dollar (2000) study, many papers have reacted to their results, 
including Hansen and Tarp (2000), Dalgaard and Hansen (2001), Guil-lamont and Chauvet 
(2001), Collier and Dehn (2001), Lensink and White (2001) and Collier and Dollar (2002). 
These studies react to the Burnside and Dollar study, by introducing other variables such as 
terms of trade shocks, and shocks of environmental factors. Some of these papers confirm the 
message of Burnside and Dollar that aid only works in a good policy environment; while 
others find that an aid-growth link exists regardless of the policies of a country (Figure 2). 
Initially, the Burnside Dollar study appeared promising, but other scholars have since 
replicated their research with more thorough, updated data and found a less convincing 
correlation between aid and good economic policies in generating growth. A study conducted 
by Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2003) is often cited for its contradictory findings to 
Burnside & Dollar (2000). Their study uses the same specification as Burnside & Dollar 
(2000), but adds more data that had since become available. They found that the coefficient 
on the crucial interaction between aid and policy was insignificant and found no support that 
aid works in a good policy environment (Easterly, Levine & Roodman 2003).  
 













type of aid, aptly named democracy and governance aid was found to have an impact.  Finkel 
et al. found that foreign aid targeted at improving democracy and governance has a positive 
effect (2008). Their study attempted to determine the impact of U.S. democracy assistance on 
democracy-building world wide between 1990 and 2003. They found that for every $10 
million of additional dollars of U.S. democracy assistance, a country experienced .25 units of 
growth on the Freedom House index in a given year. Bollen, Paxton and Morishima (2005) 
found that aid, with the particular focus of strengthening democracy accomplished this to a 
small effect. Svensson (1999) focuses on aid and democracy, but only to the extent that aid 
more readily achieves economic growth in states with higher degrees of political and civil 
liberties.  
 
The literature that directly provides an assessment of the MCC is sparse. The most 
influential is a study conducted by Johnson and Zajonc (2006) that analyzed the MCC aid as 
an incentive to pursue good policies. Their findings showed that potential recipients of MCC 
funds improve 25 % more indicators after the MCC incentive was offered than before it 
(Johnson and Zajonc 2006). While it is conceivable that policies and institutions were 
improved through the incentive of a multi million-dollar grant, it is not clear what affect 
foreign aid had on democracy. Johnson and Zajonc (2006) make no claim as to what impact, 
if any, MCC aid has had on long-term growth rates or poverty eradication.  
 
1.3.3 Obstacles to Development 
A number of variables are attributed to the hindrance of development. On this topic, I 
tap the most recent literature that names particular development “traps”. Paul Collier specifies 
four particular hindrances to development, namely, conflict, natural resources, geography, and 
governance. Collier attributes these four traps to lack of development of Africa's poor 
countries. (2007) I briefly elaborate on each trap and their significance to development. 
 
Conflict 
A severe challenge to development in SSA is the prevalence of political instability and 
violence. For instance, it is estimated that 40% of SSA has experienced a least one period of 
civil war in the last 40 years (Elbadawi 2000). The prevalence of political instability and the 
fact that the world's poor are centered in SSA is not likely to be a coincidence. The paradigm 
can be reversed as well to suggest that countries with high levels of poverty are more likely to 













have dramatic consequences for a country's economy and for democracy’s survival. While any 
type of instability or domestic conflict may have an adverse effect on a country’s rate of 
development, a civil war may have a particularly nasty effect.  A typical seven-year civil war 
is projected to leave a country 15% poorer than it would have been (Collier 2007). In addition 
to a 15% drop in productivity, civil war's costs are likely to continue through economic 
depression and disease. By definition, a civil war is a reversal of democratic principles. When 
a country reverts to civil war, the warring factions bypass the democratic decision making 
process. In contrast, greater levels of political democracy and civil liberties have been 
associated with lower risk of severe conflict (Fearon & Laitin 2003). 
 
Natural Resources 
The abundance of natural resources within a developing country intrinsically seems 
beneficial and conducive to development. However, when a valuable natural resource (or 
various natural resources) makes up a substantial part of a country's GDP, it tends to inhibit 
both economic and democratic growth. Economists have termed this paradox the “Dutch 
Disease,” after the effects of the North Sea gas on the Dutch economy. The concepts behind 
the “Dutch Disease” refer to the apparent relationship between the exploitation of natural 
resources and decline in other sectors of a country’s economy. The resource exports cause a 
country's currency to rise against other countries making manufacturing exports less 
competitive in international trade. In addition to hindering exports, natural resources are prone 
to booms and busts. A couple of examples of natural resource booms and subsequent busts 
come to mind including the Kenyan coffee bean boom 1976-79
3
, and the 1986 Nigerian oil 
bust
4
. Any economist or investor will agree that the “Dutch Disease,” and volatility in 
commodity prices inhibit economic growth. Furthermore, the economy of a country is 
healthier and stands a better chance for development when its markets are diversified and its 
economic and political future predictable. It is very probable that a country's economic growth 
largely depends on the presence of natural resources. Dependency on natural resources has 
been proven bad for democratic growth. Developing countries rich in valuable natural 
resources are prone to a system of patronage and rents causing democracy to be thwarted. 
Political scientists have presented empirical evidence suggesting a robust and negative 
correlation between the presence of a sizable natural resource sector and the level of 
democracy in Africa (Jensen, Wantchekon 2004). Rents and other forms of corruption 
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 The price of coffee quadrupled from 1976-79 following a frost damaged Brazilian coffee crop. 
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Geographical conditions can be a considerable obstacle to growth, and hinder the 
effectiveness of aid. Economic development requires commerce; commerce requires the 
movement of products from one location to another. This basic notion in trade has dramatic 
implications for poor, landlocked countries with harsh terrain. In this situation where a 
country has challenging geographic qualities, large-scale trade is often inhibited by lack of 
ports, politically unstable neighbors, no navigable rivers and overall high transport costs. 
These costly attributes make economic development all the more difficult to achieve. Adam 
Smith cited by Sachs (2006) recognized the role high transport costs played in development 
when he said, 
  
As by means of water-carriage a more extensive market is opened to every sort of 
industry than what land-carriage alone can afford it, so it is upon the sea-coast, and 
along the banks of navigable rivers, that industry of every kind naturally begins to sub-
divide and improve itself, and it is frequently not till a long time after that those 
improvements extend themselves to the inland part of the country (Sachs 2006). 
 
Governance 
Finally, governance has inherent implications bearing on growth. As seen by much of 
the literature regarding governance, economic and democratic development requires a 
government oriented towards development. Economist and social scientists have learned that 
certain policies and institutions are more conducive to development than others. In above 

























The Bush Administration utilized the MCC to disburse U.S. billions in aid. As 
previously mentioned, the MCC selected countries that met a strict set of criteria. It is this 
program for which this study intends to produce a summative evaluation and provide further 
information on the general effectiveness of aid. During this evaluation I will quantitatively 
and qualitatively address the worth and performance of this particular disbursement of aid by 
the U.S. 
 
The larger concept of MCC foreign aid can be divided into three separate independent 
variables measuring incentive, monitoring, and size. Through three levels of quantitative 
analysis I analyze: 1) the impact of the incentive of MCC on political and economic 
development; 2), the impact of the MCC’s monitoring component on political and economic 
development; and 3) the impact of the absolute size of the MCC grant on political and 
economic development. I identify four distinct groups of countries within SSA that are 
measured throughout the three analytical levels. These groups have important differences in 
levels of wealth and quality of governance. The four groups of countries include: 1) all 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA); 2) countries that have a decent chance of qualifying 
for MCC aid (Eligible); 3) countries that are either too wealthy, too despotic, or legally 
prohibited by the U.S. Congress to qualify for a MCC grant (Ineligible) and; 4) countries that 
eventually qualified for and were selected to receive aid disbursements from the MCC 
(MCC). In essence, these groups are designed according to whether or not a country is eligible 
for a MCC grant. The (MCC) countries are generally low to middle income countries with 
Freedom House scores ranging between 5 and 1. Below, I provide more details on the 
analytical structure of the experiment involving the incentive, monitoring and size of MCC 
aid. 
 
To determine whether the incentive of MCC aid prompted development, I consider the 
experience of three different groups of countries between 2004 and 2006. First, I consider the 













incentive on (Ineligible) countries, and lastly on (MCC) countries. The comparison among 
these three groups will render data useful for determining if the incentive of MCC aid 
generated political and economic development.  
 
Since the MCC has an extensive monitoring and evaluation component to each 
compact, it is also important to measure the impact of monitoring on development between 
2006 and 2008. For this empirical step, I consider the groups (Eligible) and (Ineligible) and 
(MCC). Does the possibility of losing a portion or all of the committed funds help keep 
development on track? These tests will determine whether countries tend to backslide 
following aid disbursements or if the threat of losing the grant is strong enough to keep 
development on track.  
 
To determine whether the absolute size of the MCC grants matter in terms of 
development, I analyze ODA data on three sets of countries. First, I analyze the group (SSA) 
followed by (Eligible) and, finally, (MCC) between 2005 and 2008. This empirical analysis 
will test if gradations in the size of aid produce any correlations to development.  Table 1 
summarizes which country-group is considered in conjunction with each independent 
variable.   
 
          Table 1: Samples Considered Under Independent Variables 
Incentive Monitoring   Size 
Eligible Eligible    SSA 
Ineligible Ineligible   Eligible 
 MCC   MCC 
 
 
2.2 Research Methodology     
To provide an overall assessment of the MCC, I examine the association between 
foreign aid disbursed through the MCC and development through a quantitative methodology 
using two types of statistical analysis: difference of means analysis and bivariate analysis. 
First, I will test whether the difference between the average (mean) change in economic 
growth and change in democracy of the four country groups are statistically significant. The 













groups are all equal. Since the dependent variable is comprised of two indicators (economic 
growth and democratic growth), I examine each of the difference of means separately. I 
perform this type of analysis on the independent variables of incentive and monitoring. I then 
conduct a bivariate analysis on the size of aid disbursed through the MCC and change rates in 
economic development between 2005 and 2008 across the three samples of (SSA), (Eligible) 
and (MCC). I end with a case study that looks at the first three aid investments of the MCC in 
SSA. Through this case study, I search for patterns among the MCC’s three initial investments 
and draw generalizations based in the theory of realism. These generalizations assist in 
delivering a full evaluation of the MCC and comprehensively consider whether or not the 
MCC was successful as an aid agency.    
 
Figure 3: Relationship of the Independent Variable on the Dependent Variable 
 
 
2.3 Research Question 
This evaluation study analyzes the impact of MCC aid on development. The primary 
research question of this study asks: What is the impact of aid disbursed through the MCC on 
economic and democratic development in SSA? 
 
The answer to this question logically leads the reader to judge whether the money 
devoted through development aid and distributed along the criteria set out by the MCC 













the overall validity of foreign aid as an agent of developmental change.  
 
2.4 Expectations 
Generally speaking, I expect to find an overall significant, but weak relationship 
between MCC aid and development.  However across the different tests of the independent 
variables of incentive, monitoring, and size, I expect varied results. Theoretically, the MCC 
group should perform the best during each test. The literature on the MCC incentive found 
that potential recipients of MCC aid performed better than a control group measured after the 
formation of the MCC (Johnson & Zajonc 2006). Their study attributes this quicker 
developmental pace to the higher quality of policies within the countries selected by the 
MCC.  
 
A crucial component (and a significant expense) of the MCC aid compacts is the 
monitoring and evaluation of the progress and performance of each country. The threat of 
losing a compact is real. This is evidenced by the recent retraction of remaining part of 
Madagascar's compact in response to the recent coup d´e tat in 2009. In testing the effect of 
monitoring on development, I, again, expect that the MCC countries will perform better than 
other sub-Saharan African countries. Since the threat of losing a compact is real and not an 
empty threat, it is realistic to think that monitoring may have a true impact on development. 
 
Finally, I expect to find that the relationship between absolute size of MCC aid and 
development to be weak and insignificant. A brief survey of the past forty years of aid has 
shown that less aid could actually mean more growth for Africa. The literature also suggests 
that larger amounts of aid can actually damage an economy and slow overall development. 
Larger amounts of aid have also been show to have negative macroeconomic impacts. Aid, if 
not managed correctly, can negatively affect prices and incentives. With large inflows of aid, 
Dutch Disease becomes a concern, which, in turn, may have harmful impacts on exports and 
other sectors. For these reasons, I do not anticipate that the size will positively impact 
development. I am particularly skeptical that the indicator of economic development will 
show promising results. However, it is possible that countries bettered themselves 
















Based on the research conducted in the literature review and the above expectations, I 
postulate four hypotheses. The first is a general hypothesis and is followed by three specific 
hypotheses.  From the second and third hypotheses, I explore further suppositions.  
 
1. There is no relationship between foreign aid disbursed through the MCC and development 
from 2005-2008. This hypothesis will act as the null hypothesis on which the p values 
produced by the ANOVA tests will be based. 
2. There is a relationship between the incentive of MCC aid and political and economic 
development.  
a. The effectiveness of the incentive of MCC aid on economic growth will be 
statistically weaker than that of democratic growth. 
b. Under the incentive, countries later receiving a disbursement of aid will develop at 
a quicker pace than those not receiving aid. 
3. There is a relationship between MCC monitoring of aid and development. 
a. The effectiveness of MCC monitoring on economic growth will be statistically 
weaker than that of democratic growth. 
b. During MCC monitored time frame, countries that have received a disbursement 
of aid from the MCC will develop at a quicker pace than those not receiving aid. 
4. There is a relationship between the size of the MCC aid disbursement and development.  
a. The larger the size of the aid disbursement the greater the rate of development will 
be. 
b. The larger the size of the aid disbursement the slower the rate of development will 
be. 
 
2.6 The Data Set 
The database I formulate is derived from several sources for the purposes of this 
analysis. For the variable of MCC aid, I access the documented disbursements of aid recorded 
by the MCC published on the MCC website. For the most reliable results, I only consider aid 
that has reached a country in the form of a disbursement as opposed to combining the 
disbursements and contract commitments. I feared that my empirical results would be 
contaminated if contract commitments were added to aid totals. For total disbursements of 













Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD/ Official Development Aid data set (2005, 
2006, 2007, 2008). To determine the change in economic growth, I gather GNI per capita data 
between 2004 and 2008 from the World Bank (2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008). To determine 
change in democracy, I access the Freedom House scores of each country between 2004 and 
2008 (2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008).  
 
Throughout the qualitative section, I rely on a conglomeration of indicators and data 
sources including the Heritage Foundation index of economic freedom (2009), the World 
Bank logistics index (2007), and the World Bank indicator of control of corruption (2004, 
2008). I also rely heavily on the MCC website for details about particular MCC-related 









































The impetus for the MCC can be linked to the economic study conducted by Craig 
Burnside and David Dollar entitled “Aid, Policies and Growth” (2000). The two economists 
summarize their findings by saying, “We find that aid has a positive impact on growth in 
developing countries with good fiscal, monetary, and trade policies, but has little effect in the 
presence of poor policies” (Burnside & Dollar 2000). It is apparent that this study along with 
other supporting studies helped form a basis for the foreign aid policy of the Bush 
Administration. President Bush noted in a speech on March 14, 2002: 
 
Yet many of the old models of economic development assistance are outdated. Money 
that is not accompanied by legal and economic reform is oftentimes wasted.... Sound 
economic policies unleash the enterprise and creativity necessary for development. So 
we will reward nations that have more open markets and sustainable budget policies, 
nations where people can start and operate a small business without running the 




Two years after the speech, the Millennium Challenge Corporation began operations 
with the task of administering five billion dollars in foreign aid. According to Johnson and 
Zajonc (2006), the formation of the MCC represents the most significant shift in United States 
foreign aid policy since President Kennedy signed the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
resulting in the formation of the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID). Additionally, the five billion dollar program for which the MCC is responsible 
represents a 50% increase in aid to Africa. Major foreign aid initiatives like these warrant 
greater academic attention and wider statistical analysis.  
 
This thesis asks whether the aid administered by the MCC has outwardly achieved 
development in SSA. In this chapter, I discuss the goals, objectives, and eligibility 
                                                 
5














requirements of the MCC, and I give descriptions of the three variables of incentive, 
monitoring and size of aid disbursement along with their economic and democratic contexts. 
Finally, I give aid (the independent variable) and the country’s economic and democratic 
development (the dependent variable) operational definitions.  
 
3.2 MCC Goals, Objectives and Eligibility Requirements 
The MCC has two goals: 1) Reduce poverty through economic growth and; 2) Deepen 
democracy (MCC 2004). While reducing poverty is the MCC primary goal, building stronger 
democracies is an important underlying theme especially in the larger context of the Bush 
Administration’s Freedom Agenda. Ultimately, the contention is that economic prosperity 




To be considered eligible for a grant, countries must meet three requirements. First, 
countries must have a per capita income equal to or lower than $3,855. Second, countries 
must not be ineligible to receive U.S. assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
(amended as the “Foreign Assistance Act”) or other provision of U.S. law (MCC 2009). Third, 
countries must show a commitment to good governance, economic freedom, and investments 
in their citizens. For the purposes of this study, the countries with a Freedom House rating of 
seven are not considered eligible. Countries that lack freedom and openness are often despotic 
and unlikely to respond to any aid that requires good governance for eligibility. A complete 
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MCC Eligible Countries in SSA 
1. Angola     19. Lesotho 
2. Benin      20. Liberia 
3. Burkina Faso     21. Malawi 
4. Cameroon     22. Mali  
5. Cape Verde    23. Mozambique 
6. Central African Republic   24. Namibia 
7. Chad      25. Niger 
8. Comoros      26. Nigeria 
9. Congo, Republic   27. Papua New Guinea 
10. Dem. Republic of the Congo  28. Rwanda 
11. Djibouti      29. Sao Tome and Principe 
12. Eritrea      30. Senegal  
13. Ethiopia     31. Sierra Leone 
14. Gambia      32. Tanzania 
15. Ghana      33. Togo 
16. Guinea      34. Uganda 
17. Guinea Bissau     35. Zambia 
18. Kenya   
 
 
MCC Ineligible Countries in SSA 
 
1. Botswana                9. Seychelles     
2. Cameroon             10. Somalia 
3. Chad              11. South Africa 
4. Cote D’Ivoire             12. Sudan 
5. Equatorial Guinea             13. Swaziland 
6. Eritrea              14. Zimbabwe  























Sixteen policy indicators of country performance guide the MCC selection process. 
The governing board of the MCC selects compact-eligible countries based on three broad 
policy categories: Ruling Justly, Investing in People, and Encouraging Economic Freedom 
(MCC 2004).  
 
The Ruling Justly category includes assessments that measure 
 
• Civil Liberties (Freedom House)  
• Political Rights (Freedom House)  
• Voice and Accountability (World Bank Institute)  
• Government Effectiveness (World Bank Institute)  
• Rule of Law (World Bank Institute)  
• Control of Corruption (World Bank Institute) 
 
The Investing in People category includes assessments that measure 
 
• Immunization Rates (World Health Organization)  
• Public Expenditure on Health (World Health Organization)  
• Girls’ Primary Education Completion Rate (UNESCO and World Bank)  
• Public Expenditure on Primary Education (UNESCO and national sources)  
• Natural Resource Management (CIESIN and YCELP) 
 
The Encouraging Economic Freedom category includes assessments that measure 
 
• Business Start-Up (IFC)  
• Land Rights and Access (IFAD and IFC)  
• Trade Policy (Heritage Foundation)  
• Regulatory Quality (World Bank Institute)  
• Inflation (IMF)  
• Fiscal Policy (National Sources; cross-checked with IMF) (MCC 2004)  
 
Selected countries that meet the above criteria then identify their own priorities for 
achieving sustainable economic growth.  Countries are encouraged to develop a plan for 












maximum participation. The country then develops a comprehensive proposal that 
incorporates the input of the community groups. The MCC emphasizes the necessity for 
partnership during the five-year MCC compact requiring countries to set up their own local 
MCC accountable entity to manage and oversee all aspects of implementation.  
 
The MCC has been functioning for five years, with over $3 billion dollars in 
expenditures and commitments in SSA. Now, the task at hand is to empirically test only for 
results produced by the MCC aid program. Through these findings I hope to deliver a better 
assessment of the MCC’s productiveness as an instigator of development. The economic and 
institutional literature makes the MCC program seem promisingly productive in achieving 
development within a country. If institutions are improved, is a state more likely to spur on its 
economy and strengthen its democracy? Does aid, such as that administered by the MCC 
become effective in the presence of good governance? These are questions that this thesis 
hopes to answer with quantitative and qualitative analysis in the following paragraphs.  
 
3.3 Economic and Democratic Context  
Economic and democratic context is needed to determine the impact of the MCC. A 
contextual basis will help to control for the overall trends of economic and democratic 
development in SSA. To fully comprehend the importance of context, one need only look 
back to the world economic crisis that happened in the fall of 2008. Economic shocks can 
have many ramifications for foreign aid and development in general. This is particularly true 
for developing countries with fragile political and economic situations (Collier & Dehn 2001). 
Of course, hundreds of factors are associated with economic growth. Similarly, many different 
factors are associated with democratic development and consolidation. In this section, I will 
provide economic and democratic context for the two periods of time under consideration in 
this study. I will begin by addressing the context of the period between 2004 and 2006 
followed by the period between 2006 and 2008 thus covering the entire time frame considered 
in this study. In these two periods, I consider the economic and democratic conditions among 
all countries in SSA, non-MCC countries and MCC countries between 2004 and 2008.  
 
Between 2004 and 2006 all countries in SSA increased in wealth. As shown in Figure 
4, average national GNI levels rose and nearly every country increased in wealth. SSA and 













participated to a lesser extent in GNI growth. This is not surprising since many of these 
countries are in a low-income category and have less wealth to begin with. In SSA the average 
national GNI per capita grew by 37.5% and non-MCC average national GNI per capita grew 
by 39.8%. MCC grew at a slightly slower pace averaging 31.7% growth in GNI per capita. 
 
Between 2006 and 2008, a similar pattern of growth occurred as shown in Figure 5. 
The average GNI per capita of Sub-Saharan African countries grew 32.2% and the average 
GNI per capita of non-MCC grew 33.2%. The GNI per capita of MCC countries grew slightly 
slower averaging 30.2% growth. 
 
 






































Figure 5: GNI Growth 2006-2008 (World Bank 2009) 
 
 
To determine regional democratization trends, I measure the average levels of 
democracy using the Freedom House index.
7
 Once again, I compare the general trend between 
SSA, non-MCC countries, and MCC countries. By doing this, regional trends become clear. It 
is evident from Figure 6 that all three groups increased their level in democracy between 2004 
and 2006. On average, countries in SSA decreased by .1, and MCC countries decreased by .2 
on the Freedom House scale. On average, non-MCC countries remained virtually unchanged. 
Figure 7 shows that SSA and MCC countries became more democratic while non-MCC 
countries became slightly less democratic. On average, both SSA and MCC countries 
decreased by .1, and non-MCC countries increased by .075 on the Freedom House scale.  
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3.4 The Dependent Variable: Development 
Since development can be understood in a variety of ways, I draw upon the 
terminology contained in the United Nations (UN) Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
The MDGs are a set of eight general goals established by the United Nations Development 
Program that seek to end poverty and achieve international development by 2015.
8
 The UN 
MDGs understand development to be, in part, a reduction in poverty and positive growth in 
democratic principles and practices. Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, development 
will be conceptualized by economic growth and democratic growth. These two 
conceptualizations of development emphasize the important national characteristics of wealth 
(and the provision of basic needs) and democracy (political freedom) needed for a state to 
move towards development. Most important, this conceptualization of development captures 
the MCC's goals of poverty reduction and democratic deepening, and it allows for a quality 
assessment of the aid program.  
 
3.4.1 Economic Growth 
The MCC's primary goal is the reduction of poverty through overall economic growth. 
I operationalize economic growth by measuring Gross National Income (GNI) per capita 
growth in several country-groups during three separate time periods. These periods 
correspond with the MCC incentive of aid, monitoring of aid, and absolute size of aid. Using 
GNI per capita growth to indicate economic growth is a sound measure of a country's 
economic situation. According to the World Bank Development Report (2008), GNI per capita 
is the dollar value of a country final income divided by its population. The GNI gives an 
accurate reflection of the average income of a country's citizens. Measuring GNI per capita 
growth provides a national economic assessment, but also captures the standard of living 
enjoyed by the average citizen. In this study, I draw GNI data from the World Bank 
Development Report issued each year.   
 
3.4.2 Democratic Growth 
The MCC engages in a mission of poverty reduction in a manner that strengthens and 
deepens democracy.  In assessing the MCC's success in accomplishing this, I will use 
Freedom House to measure democracy within each MCC country. Freedom House provides 
professional ratings to measure the extent of democracy using two scales, “political rights” 
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and “civil liberties”. They apply their efforts to nearly 200 countries and territories every year 
since 1972 (Freedom House 2009). Attempting to quantify democracy has proved extremely 
difficult and controversial, particularly since scholars lack a consensus on the definition of 
democracy, its measurements, and its indices. The Freedom House political rights index 
measures the degree to which 
 the authorities are elected, 
 campaigning and elections are fair, 
 there is freedom of political organization, 
 there is opposition power, 
 there is freedom from domination by powerful elites, 
 there is reasonable self-determination for minorities . 
 
The civil liberties index measures the extent to which 
 there is freedom of belief and expression, 
 there are associational and organizational rights, 
 the rule of law prevails and human rights are respected, 
 personal autonomy and economic rights are respected (Freedom House 2009) 
 
The combination of “political rights” and “civil liberties” scores measures democracy 
as a whole. The Freedom House scale complies with Robert Dahl's criteria for polyarchy. In 
brief, Dahl assigned a precise definition of democracy or in his term, polyarchy. He described 
polyarchy using seven attributes: 1) elected officials; 2) free and fair elections; 3) inclusive 
suffrage; 4) the right to run for office; 5) freedom of expression; 6) alternative information; 7) 
associational autonomy (O’Donnell 2001). Dahl continues by saying that a country is a 
pluralist democracy if it is a democracy in the sense of polyarchy and important organizations 
are relatively autonomous. These conceptualizations of democracy will manifest themselves 
in the MCC indicators. 
 
3.5 The Independent Variables: Incentive, Monitoring, and Size of 
Disbursement  
The criteria for determining eligibility for a MCC grant are clear, and the concepts 
utilized by the MCC to encourage development are equally transparent. The MCC’s 













multifaceted. However, three main elements comprise the engines for the goal of 
development. The three elements are incentive, monitoring, and the very large size of the 
actual aid given through the program. Through these three elements, I will empirically test the 
MCC’s usefulness in generating development. These three elements are unique to the MCC as 
an aid agency. Generally speaking, the incentive for reform has never been so strong, the 
monitoring and evaluation of each aid investment has never been so thorough, and the 
amounts of aid administered through the MCC are unprecedented in size.  In the following 
paragraphs, I explore these three elements in depth and provide the necessary economic and 
democratic context needed for further evaluation. 
 
Incentive 
Using aid as an incentive for reform is not a new phenomenon. The Reagan 
Administration insisted on reform in return for aid calling for a recipient country to “put its 
own financial and economic house in order” (Bovard 1986). The aid programs of the 1980’s 
became inundated with these types of conditionalities. Despite the Reagan Administration and 
other administration’s fervent calls for reform, little change was seen through the use of aid as 
an incentive. Paul Collier notes one of these failures with the example of Kenya's reform 
commitments to the World Bank in return for aid. Over a fifteen-year period, Kenya made 
five separate reform commitments, but broke its commitment each and every time (Collier 
2007). Even today it is common for aid agencies such as the World Bank or the International 
Monetary Fund to assign aid before any reforms are made or policies improved. But, this type 
of ex ante conditionality differs from the MCC approach. Recognizing the unproductiveness 
of these types of conditionalities, the MCC devised another novel structure to use aid as an 
incentive for reform. The MCC has implemented ex post rewards for reform, meaning that aid 
is given only after reforms are implemented. The MCC ideally advertised millions of dollars 
in aid to those countries that meet the criteria outlined above. Theoretically, ex post aid should 
produce far-reaching impacts with less risk before any aid disbursements. Even though MCC 
is still in its infancy, some argue that it has already been successful in improving economic 
and democratic institutions as previously noted in the literature review. In fact, it is a stated 
objective of the MCC to improve these policies and institutions before any aid is committed. 
Some scholars are referring to the democratic reform that occurs in anticipation of aid an 
“MCC effect”. The “MCC Effect” refers to the phenomenon of countries strengthening their 
own democratic institutions in an effort to qualify for millions of dollars of untied aid. It is 













reform their institutions before the US Government gives away a penny. Again, Johnson and 
Zajonc (2006) make the observation that MCC candidate countries are more likely to improve 
their performance on policy and institutional indicators writing that, “Overall, candidate 
countries reformed approximately 25 percent more indicators after the creation of the MCC 
than before it, compared to poor non-candidate countries.” Their initial assessments of the 
MCC’s incentive structure suggest that countries respond to incentive with real reform. Nearly 
three years after their study, I look for evidence that shows whether or not the MCC incentive 
of millions in aid is still producing development in SSA.  
 
Monitoring 
Traditionally, aid agencies have ignored systems that monitor and evaluate the 
productiveness of aid disbursements. But, prior experience points to the desperate need for 
some type of accountability when dealing with aid. A study conducted by the World Bank 
found that 85% of aid was used for purposes other than that for which they were initially 
intended, often redirected to unproductive and undemocratic ventures (Moyo 2009). Further 
research by Svensson has shown “no link between a country’s reform effort or fulfillment of 
conditionality and the disbursement rate of aid funds” (Svensson 2003). Thomas Sowell notes 
that, “The availability of foreign aid reduces the necessity for a country to restrict its 
investments to economically viable projects or reduce its level of corruption” (Sowell 2004).  
At times, money does not reach those who are intended recipients, but instead falls into the 
hands of government strongmen and powerful elite. Many more instances of abuse have been 
documented, and much more could be written about the misuse of aid. The need for 
accountability is clear. That is why the MCC has incorporated an extensive system of 
monitoring and evaluation ensuring that aid is spent in a seemingly productive manner and is 
not diverted. Tight oversight and performance measurements are priced into each compact. 
On average, MCC devotes $6.9 million dollars or 2.3% of each compact to monitoring the aid 
that has been disbursed in SSA. This close scrutiny of aid activities may have positive impact 
on development. In the following chapter, I look for empirical evidence that monitoring 
positively impacts development. 
 
Size of Aid Disbursement 
In a period when aid is more popular than ever, it is critical to consider whether the 
size of the MCC aid package makes a difference in terms of development, and if the larger aid 













the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are fervently calling for even larger 
amounts of aid. The highly publicized MGDs initiated in 2000 call for an end to poverty by 
2025 by encouraging billions of dollars in new aid flows. The big-push mentality is prevalent 
among aid advocates. Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs insists that aid will need to make up 
20 to 30 per cent of developing countries' GDP in order to eradicate poverty. Sachs even goes 
so far to suggest that nations like the United States should reduce national security spending 
in order to fund the massive increases in aid (Sachs 2006). As noted earlier, some wealthy 
nations have responded to these calls with significant aid increases. For example, during a 
2002 United Nations Conference on Financing for Development held in Monterrey, Mexico, 
wealthy nations promised to increase aid contributions from an average of 0.25 per cent of 
GNP to 0.7 per cent amounting to an additional US$200 billion per year (Moyo 2009). The 
notion that greater amounts of aid are needed for development is gaining momentum. The 
primary concern of this thesis is the impact of the significant aid increases that were tied to 
the MCC. From 2005-2008, the MCC has committed over $1 billion dollars in aid to eight 
countries in SSA. Figure 8 shows the precise size of each MCC compact in SSA.  
 
















It is conceivable that other foreign assistance from non-MCC donors had an influence 
on the dependent variables of economic and democratic development. To assess the weight of 
the impact that other foreign assistance may have had, Figure 9 outlines other development 
assistance as measured by OECD/DAC Official Development Assistance (ODA) statistics. 
The OECD/DAC monitors all ODA from any governments. Its measurements exclude 
military aid and focuses on grants that are monetarily similar to the MCC grant. Even though 
other aid donors claim to focus their aid efforts on countries that exhibit signs of good 
governance, this is often not the case. Alesina and Weder (2002) find that there is no 
relationship between bilateral and multilateral aid and the corruption level of recipient 
governments.  
 
 Figure 9: Total ODA Disbursed in 2006 (OECD 2009) 
 
 
To date, the MCC has invested in nearly twenty countries in SSA. This research 
attempts to understand the impact the MCC incentive of aid, monitoring of aid and the size of 
the aid disbursement in SSA. Particular attention will be given to the eight compacts signed 
up to 2006 and those that resulted in actual aid disbursements. In the following chapter, I 





















This chapter seeks to tell empirically the MCC's level of success in producing 
development in participating sub-Saharan African countries. More particularly, this chapter 
seeks to empirically uncover any relationship between aid disbursed through the MCC and the 
two indicators of development: economic and democratic growth. Since the MCC is still in its 
infancy, this chapter is restricted to analyzing the impact of the MCC aid on eight sub-Saharan 
African countries over a two-year period.  These countries include Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape 
Verde, Madagascar, Malawi, Sao Tome and Principe, Tanzania, and Zambia. The MCC's aid 
disbursements to these countries have totaled approximately $307 million dollars.  
 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section determines the impact of 
the incentive of aid from the MCC. The next section determines the impact of the rigorous 
monitoring component of the MCC once aid is disbursed. The first two determinations are 
achieved through an analysis of the differences in economic and democratic growth among 
three separate groups of countries in SSA. Finally, I test whether the absolute size of the MCC 
aid disbursement is correlated with political and economic development. I conduct bivariate 
analyses to gauge whether development is correlated with the absolute size of the 
disbursement. I control for non-MCC development aid as a cause of development by using the 
total amount of aid received by countries in SSA between 2005 and 2008. In addition to 
providing an overall assessment of the MCC, this study works to detect whether selecting 
countries with quality governance makes a difference in making aid productive.  
 
 Throughout this chapter, I consider all countries within SSA plus three sub-groups 
within SSA. The distinctions are primarily economic and democratic, and reflect the goals and 
values of the MCC. The first group is composed of countries that could feasibly qualify for 
MCC aid, and are good potential candidates for selection by the MCC. The second group is 
made up of countries that are either too rich or too despotic to be considered for MCC aid. 
This group has no MCC related incentive since their probability of receiving aid is low. The 













receiving MCC aid. Various comparisons among these three groups can provide valuable 
information in determining if aid from the MCC impacted development. 
 
4.2 Aid as an Incentive for Development  
This section attempts to evaluate the MCC's incentive effect on development. Previous 
research has suggested that some countries indeed, did improve economic policies and 
democratic governance in hopes of receiving aid from the MCC (Johnson & Zajonc 2006). 
This study goes a step further and seeks to answer the question: are there detectable 
differences in the rate of development as a result of the incentive of aid from the MCC? Since 
I operationalize development with two indicators, I begin assessing each separately. First, I 
look at change in economic growth among three sub-Saharan African groups, namely, 
(Eligible) countries that have a good chance of being selected by the MCC, (Ineligible) 
countries that are too rich or despotic to be considered for aid, and (MCC) countries that were 
eventually chosen to receive aid from the MCC, and compare the differences among groups 
between 2004and 2006. Second, I look at the change in democratic growth among the same 
three groups within the same time frame, and compare the differences among the groups. The 
time frame of 2004-2006 is significant, because 2004 marks the creation of the MCC. In  
2006, the MCC distributed its first mass assignment of aid in SSA. Measuring this time frame 
allows for an accurate picture of development that may be attributed to the incentive of aid 
from the MCC.  
 
Change in Economic Growth 
In SSA, all GNI per capita grew at a mean rate of 31.2% between 2004 and 2006.  
When comparing the mean change in GNI per capita of the two groups, the (Ineligible) 
countries grew at a quicker pace with a growth rate of 41.2% over a two-year period between 
2004 and 2006. The (Eligible) countries, some, which would eventually be selected to receive 
aid from the MCC grew at a slower pace with a mean GNI per capita growth rate of 27.5%. A 
oneway ANOVA revealed that there was a statistically significant difference of mean 
economic growth between the two groups, F (1, 42) = 3.232, p ≤ .079,  = .071. Figure 10 
shows the mean growth rates between the two groups. According to the data, the MCC 
incentive did not translate into stronger economic development for the countries eligible for 
the MCC grant. In fact, the countries with no chance of receiving aid from the MCC grew 













grant.  While Johnson and Zajonc (2006) found that incentives improved economic policy, the 
data in this study shows no evidence that the incentive alone incited economic growth.  
 
             Figure 10: Incentive and Change in Economic Growth 2004-2006 
 
 
Change in Democratic Growth 
 In SSA all countries grew by a mean of .088 points on the Freedom House scale over a 
two-year period. The (Eligible) countries grew by a mean of .091, and the (Ineligible) 
countries grew by a mean of .083 points on the Freedom House scale. A oneway ANOVA 
revealed that there was a statistically insignificant difference in the mean democratic growth 
rates between the two groups, F (1, 43) = .005, p ≤ .943,  = 0. Figure 11 shows the mean 
growth rates between the two groups. Although the significance of the different means is low, 
the (Eligible) countries clearly became more democratic after the MCC aid was advertised in 
2002. This data corroborates the findings of Johnson and Zajonc (2006) that developing 
countries reacted, albeit slightly to the incentive of millions in aid by further consolidating 














            Figure 11: Incentive and Change in Democracy 2004-2006 
 
 
4.3 Monitoring as an Impact on Development 
 The complex system of monitoring and evaluation within each MCC compact is 
extensive. This type of monitoring infrastructure warrants consideration as an agent of 
development. This section poses the question: did the MCC countries achieve economic 
growth more quickly than other countries in SSA from 2006-2008? The first real consignment 
of MCC aid came in 2006 to eight countries in SSA. Testing for the impact of monitoring in 
these eight countries will provide a sense to whether accountability during the development 
process works better than when a country is left to its on devices. I measure the impact of 
monitoring through the same two indicators as the previous section: economic growth and 
democratic growth. I focus on countries that are able to receive aid (Eligible), countries that 
are too rich or too despotic to receive aid (Ineligible), and countries already receiving aid 
disbursements from the MCC (MCC). The statistical test of ANOVA will determine if the 













attributed to the MCC monitoring component of each compact. 
     
Change in Economic Growth  
 In all SSA countries, GNI per capita grew at a pace of 31.9% over two years during 
the period between 2006 and 2008. The GNI per capita of (Eligible) countries grew at a pace 
of 28.47% during the same period. The GNI per capita of (Ineligible) countries grew 34.05%, 
and the GNI per capita of the (MCC) countries grew 28.68% during the same period. Figure 
12 shows the difference of means between the three groups of countries. A oneway ANOVA 
revealed that there was a statistically insignificant difference of mean economic growth rates 
between the two groups F (2, 40) = .140, p ≤ .869,  = .007. After aid had been at work in 
MCC countries for at least three years, and after it had been submitted to a rigorous 
monitoring process, it appears that MCC countries still did not exhibit economic growth that 
significantly outpaced their sub-Saharan African neighbors. Each compact was designed to 
stimulate economic growth. The compacts were closely monitored to insure that the money 
assigned for certain projects achieved its particular purpose. Additionally, regular 
implementation status reports were required from each country receiving aid from the MCC. 
While this monitoring program prevented any mismanagement of aid funds, this apparently 
did not translate into short-term economic growth.   
 
Change in Democratic Growth 
 While monitoring provided virtually no impact on economic growth, a fairly strong 
impact was felt by monitoring on democratic growth. Both the (Eligible) countries and the 
(Ineligible) countries regressed democratically, while the (MCC) countries experienced 
positive democratic growth between 2006 and 2008. The (Eligible) countries lost -.100 point, 
and the (Ineligible) countries lost -.250 points on the Freedom House scale. However, during 
the same time period the (MCC) countries experienced a .063 point increase in democratic 
growth. Figure 13 shows the difference of means changes in democratic growth. A oneway 
ANOVA suggested that the differences in democratic growth is statistically insignificant at, F 
(2, 42) = 1.433, p ≤ .250,  = .064. The p value of the ANOVA test suggests that the 
monitoring component is not likely to be the instigator of democratic growth. Even though aid 















                            Figure 12: Monitoring and Change in Economic Growth 2006-2008 
 














4.4 Size of MCC Aid Disbursement and Development 
 The Bush Administration committed massive amounts of development aid to SSA. In 
this section, I analyze over $3 billion dollars in aid administered by the MCC. Since the size 
of this aid disbursement is so munificent, I assess the productivity of aid according to the size 
of the disbursement. This section is focused on answering the core question of this thesis: 
what is the impact of foreign aid disbursed through the MCC on development? To gain a 
descriptive and comparative outlook on development I employ a series of bivariate 
correlations (Pearson's R) and scatter plots. Performing this type of analysis between variables 
will measure the strength of the relationship numerically. The time frame in which all of these 
correlations are conducted is from 2005-2008. The first in the series of bivariate correlations 
is conducted on all countries in SSA. I test for any association among the absolute size of the 
aid disbursement and change in economic growth and change in democracy. On the same 
group, I use a bivariate correlation to test for any association between change in size of the aid 
disbursement and change in economic growth and change in democracy. Next, I conduct a 
bivariate correlation on those countries that are eligible to receive aid from the MCC. While 
aid to these countries was never given through the MCC, many other wealthy countries 
provided development aid. I test for any association among the absolute size of the aid 
disbursement and change in growth and change in democracy. Finally, I conduct a bivariate 
correlation on absolute size of aid and change in economic growth and change in democracy 
in countries that received aid from the MCC.  
 
Size of Aid Disbursement in Sub-Saharan Africa  
An examination of the scatter plot in Figure 14 reveals a positive, but weak association 
between absolute size of the aid disbursement and GNI per capita growth among countries in 
SSA. This observation is reinforced by the bivariate correlation (Pearson’s r = .204). The 
scatter plot shows a small, tight upward trend between size of aid disbursements and change 
in GNI with Ethiopia, Sudan and, Zambia responding the best. I conclude from this empirical 
test that all aid from all donors from 2005-2006 has played a minor role in growing each 
country's GNI per capita.  
 
To test the possibility that a larger amount of aid is necessary to achieve economic 
growth, I test for an association between the change in size of all development aid from all 













weak association (Pearson’s r = -.176) exists between change in size of aid and change in GNI 
per capita. The scatter plot, again, shows a tightly grouped set of countries with a slight 
upward trend in GNI per capita in response to change in aid. These findings agree with the 
literature that points towards a harmful relationship between too much aid and growth. In 
scatter pot in Figure 16, a negative bivariate correlation (Pearson’s r = -.123) is found between 
the absolute size of the aid disbursement and change in democracy. This is not surprising 
considering the wide body of literature that speaks to aid’s role in undemocratic activities 
such as corruption and centralization of power. Many countries saw no change in democracy 
regardless of the amount of aid while most of the remaining countries’ democratic standings 
regressed. Nigeria seems to have responded the worst with copious amounts of aid and a half 
a point negative change in democracy. Lastly, Figure 17 shows the change in the size of aid 
and the change in democracy. During this test a positive, but weak relationship was found 
with a bivariate correlation of Pearson’s r = .131. Again, many countries saw no change in the 
level of democracy regardless of the change in size of aid disbursements. For instance, 
Cameroon saw the largest increase in aid and still saw no change in the level of democracy. 
This suggests that increases in aid may not lead to higher levels of democracy.   
 














     Figure 15: Change in Absolute Size of Aid Disbursements to SSA and Change in Economic Growth 2005-2008 
 














                          Figure 17: Change in Absolute Size of Aid Disbursements in SSA and Change in Democracy 2005-2008 
 
Size of Aid in Countries Eligible for a MCC Grant  
The scatter plot (Figure 18) of size of aid and countries that are eligible for MCC aid 
showed a slightly stronger correlation. With a bivariate correlation of Pearson’s r = .285, it 
appears that aid had a slightly more significant impact on economic growth in countries 
eligible for a MCC grant. Yet, the correlation is still weak and aid can only claim meager 
credit for economic growth seen between 2005-2008.  When testing for a relationship 
between absolute size of an aid disbursement to countries eligible for MCC aid and change in 
democracy (Figure 19), I found the relationship to be negative. With a Pearson correlation of -















   Figure 18: Absolute Size of Aid to Countries Eligible for MCC Aid and Change in Economic Growth 2005-2008 
 














Absolute Size of Aid to Countries Selected by the MCC 
The literature on good governance and good economic policy would suggest that the 
MCC countries would be the first to show signs of economic and democratic growth. An 
examination of the scatter plot (Figure 20) reveals a positive, but weak relationship between 
the absolute size of aid and economic growth in the eight MCC countries. The test for 
association between aid and change in economic growth in countries selected by the MCC 
produced Pearson correlation of r = .222. This weak correlation suggests that aid from the 
MCC likely had very little impact on growth seen between 2005 and 2008 in MCC countries. 
The scatter plot provides additional contextual information. Madagascar received over twice 
as much aid as Tanzania and Zambia, yet Madagascar grew at a slower rate. Although these 
eight countries are a microcosm of the overall picture of aid, these observations suggests that 
the amount of aid may not necessarily be proportionate to the amount of economic growth.   
 
With a bivariate correlation of Pearson’s r = .394, the most impactful relationship was 
found to be between size of aid and change in democracy in countries selected by the MCC. 
However, the scatter plot (Figure 21) reveals that only Zambia responded dramatically to the 
size of the aid disbursement with a full point change in positive democratic growth. Tanzania 
saw the largest aid disbursement yet so no growth in its level of democracy. Madagascar 
received a sizable aid package yet regressed in its democratic standing. Democracy in all the 













 Figure 20: Absolute Size of Aid Disbursements to MCC Countries and Change in Economic Growth 2005-2008 
 














4.5 Summary of Empirical Findings 
An early assessment of the MCC's first four years of significant investment in SSA 
would suggest that the program has produced only slight results. The quantitative methods 
chosen for this study provide empirical evidence that the MCC incentive of aid, monitoring of 
aid, and absolute size of aid produced very little positive impact on economic and democratic 
development. Using reputable data from credible sources, I measured the differences in 
economic and democratic growth among eligible and ineligible countries in SSA and among 
countries that received aid from the MCC and those who did not. I continued by measuring 
the associations between absolute size of aid and economic and democratic development. In 
all cases except one, the differences in means were insignificant and all correlations were 
causally unconvincing.  
 
Some researchers insist that the impacts of aid on economic growth occur over long 
time lags (Reddy & Minoiu 2006). Obviously, if this is the case, then more time is needed 
before a country feels the effects of aid, and other MCC impact studies ought to be conducted 
in the future. The notion of economic and democratic lags is feasible, and more research is 
needed to fully understand MCC’s impact on development. 
  
The MCC’s efforts in using aid to eliminate poverty and produce economic growth 
involves many infrastructure investments that take time to complete, and whose benefits only 
become detectable after several years of use.  For example, the MCC invested a third of the 
total $307 million dollar compact on improving Benin's shipping port enabling better access 
to world markets. The MCC's aid investment in Cape Verde is another example where nearly a 
third of the total $110 million dollar compact is being spent on road and bridge projects and 
rehabilitating a shipping port. The projects in both Benin and Cape Verde are designed to 
encourage economic development by exposing these countries to global commerce. In most of 
the infrastructure projects conducted by the MCC, the projects are being initiated before a 
demand for them exists. These overhead expenditures create economic opportunity, but 
growth can only be realized through market activities, industry and enterprise. After economic 
progress is experienced, only then is the construction of infrastructure justified. This chapter 
has provided a macro picture of MCC’s work in SSA. In the next chapter, I search for details 















A CASE STUDY OF THREE MCC COUNTRIES 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The prior empirical results showed little evidence that the MCC was truly successful 
in accomplishing its goal of economic and democratic development in SSA. In this section, I 
comprehensively investigate three separate countries where the MCC has made investments to 
tweeze out details that may have overlooked during the quantitative research. In this chapter, I 
work to further explain the lack of impact the MCC had on economic and democratic 
development. I have chosen three countries in which aid from the MCC has been at work the 
longest theoretically producing the most visible results. These three countries also produced 
interesting results throughout the empirical chapter that warrant further investigation.  
 
Beginning in 2005, Cape Verde, Madagascar, and Zambia all received grants from the 
MCC. I expound upon these three cases and derive useful information from each that will 
help provide a qualitative evaluation of the MCC. From this case study, I aim to identify 
particular aid activities that may be associated with the disappointing empirical findings in the 
previous chapter. I search for patterns that may emerge in the three countries relative to the 
MCC aid strategy, and work to generate explanations about each instance. From these patterns 
I hope to draw generalizations about the MCC program and its impact on development or 
wider motivations for aid. I begin by relating the MCC’s aid strategy to the theory of realism 
and continue by drawing conclusions about the Bush Administration and the MCC through 
this theoretical perspective.  
 
5.2 A Unique Aid Strategy and its Impact on Development 
The MCC shifted the US aid paradigm in a different and novel way. The MCC is 
guided by the umbrella notion that greater contributions are needed from developed countries 
and greater responsibility is needed from developing countries. Many important differences 
separate it from other aid agencies and a case study of countries that the MCC has made 
investments allows for full disclosure of these differences. As discussed in previous 
paragraphs, the MCC utilized aid as an incentive for reform, closely monitored aid already at 













development. The MCC has incorporated lessons learned from other aid ventures, and applied 
sound, fundamental economic principles throughout the program. The stated principles that 
guide all aid initiatives administered by the MCC are threefold: 
  
1) Aid is most effective when it reinforces sound political, economic and social 
policies – which are key to encouraging the inflows of private capital and 
increased trade – the real engines of economic growth; 
 
2) Development plans supported by a broad range of stakeholders, and for 
which countries have a primary responsibility, engender country ownership 
and are more likely to succeed; 
  
3) Integrating monitoring and evaluation into the design of activities boosts 
effectiveness, accountability, and the transparency with which taxpayer 
resources are used (MCC 2009). 
 
In practice, these principles allow the MCC to be selective in choosing whom to 
distribute aid, to co-opt countries into a development plan instead of imposing a rigid 
Washington-based plan, and to avoid aid-related corruption thereby increasing the likelihood 
of developmental progress. By adopting these guiding principles, the MCC has avoided some 
of the traditional problems associated with aid. For example, the MCC resisted the tendency 
of tying aid to various conditions, and instead, allowed the country to consult with its citizens, 
NGO's and the private sector to draft a proposal that is then implemented, managed, and 
maintained by the country. To avoid the phenomenon known as Dutch Disease the MCC has 
focused funds on opening markets and developing various export sectors in developing 
economies. To avoid aid-related corruption, the MCC has foregone the practice of budget 
support, taken a hands-on approach, and closely monitored how aid is spent. To avoid 
rampant inflation, the MCC relies on an indicator that measures the rate of inflation before 
any aid is disbursed. The MCC was designed to function like a private business. Instead of a 
director or administrator, a CEO runs the MCC. The investments are chosen carefully 
eliminating as much risk as possible. The MCC has practices that are abnormal for a 
government agency such as detailed financial execution plans, documents noting the 














5.3 Theoretical Underpinnings of the MCC 
The Bush Administration’s diversion from past aid strategy can be better understood 
through the theoretical perspective of realism. Political realism works on the assumption that 
laws, which have their roots in human nature, govern politics. The theory represents a 
“realistic” view of international politics. It views the world as it is not the world as it ought to 
be. However, realism is also concerned with values and norms that play an important part in 
ordering international politics. This softer, value oriented side is not often associated with 
realism, but plays an important role when considering a topic such as foreign aid, which is 
innately good intentioned. It is this interplay between reality and values that gives good 
insights into the Bush Administrations' foreign aid strategy. The intersection of values and 
power is summed up by E.H. Carr when he writes,  
 
any sound political thought must be based on the elements of both utopia [i.e. values] 
and reality [i.e. power]. Where utopianism has become a hollow and intolerable sham, 
which serves merely as a disguise for the interests of the privileged, the realist 
performs an indispensable service in unmasking it. But pure realism can offer nothing 
but a naked struggle for power which makes any kind of international society 
impossible (Carr 1962). 
 
It is this combination of values and power that define the Bush Administration's 
strategy for aid. The harsh reality of the world requires one to take precautions against 
activities such as corruption, disorganization, and waste. Yet, it is a matter of values and 
goodwill to lend a hand when it is needed. The Bush Administrations approach to foreign aid 
can be further realized through Thomas Hobbes and Niccolo Machiavelli's pessimism for 
human nature and E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau’s concept of national interest in 
international politics. The theory of realism can be applied throughout the discussion of 
foreign aid and development. The motivations for foreign aid are best understood against the 
backdrop of realism and its underlying themes of anarchy in the international system, states as 
rational unitary actors and interests defined as power.  
 
Realism's unit of analysis is the state – the most appropriate unit of analysis for a 
discussion on foreign aid and economic development. The state is the principal actor and its 













disagreements and differing opinions, but in the end, a state speaks with a solitary voice. 
Realists assume that the state acts in a rational manner. Subsequently, states give thorough 
consideration to alternative options and possible outcomes. Critics of realism may disagree 
that states make their own decision and plot their own courses. Some tend to look past the 
state towards powerful multinational corporations and international governing bodies and 
assume they dictate the actions of the state. While these outside institutions may exert 
significant pressures on the state, realism theorizes that the state makes its own decisions and 
communicates them with solidarity. Realism suggests that no authority above the state is 
capable of regulating its actions. With the understanding that states act on their own volition, 
decisions regarding foreign aid can be traced back to the state itself. 
 
The international system in which states function lack an overarching authority. 
Thomas Hobbes recognizes in his work Leviathan that no supreme ruler existed to maintain 
order (1967). Interactions among states are not governed or regulated by a world government. 
Instead, these interactions take place within an anarchic international system. Since the 
international system is anarchic, states are able to act in sovereignty, autonomously and 
independently with respect to one another.  
 
A prominent principle in realism is the concept of interests defined in terms of power. 
Realism assumes that a governing principle for a politician's actions can be traced back to 
interests. Again, this move towards interests defined in terms of power is reflective of human 
nature. For the purposes of this study, power is defined as anything that establishes and 
maintains the control of man over another man. Economic, technological and diplomatic 
capabilities are especially pertinent when discussing foreign aid. Thucydides, the original 
writer in the realist tradition, claimed that interests play an important role in international 
relations. Morgenthau quotes Thucydides as writing, “Identity of interests is the surest of 
bonds whether between states or individuals” (Morgenthau, 1973).  The means to power may 
vary, but the end of every political action is power. Hans Morgenthau wrote, “International 
politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international 
politics, power is always the immediate aim” (1973).  This concept of national interest and 
power will play a large role in understanding the Bush Administration’s foreign policy 
towards developing countries.  
 













anarchy, sovereign states and interests provide explanations for why the Bush Administration 
increased aid to Africa by $9 billion dollars (Fletcher 2006). The classic writers who are 
closely associated with realism provide rich, valuable insights into international politics. The 
foundations laid by these classical writers will bring meaning and understanding to this 
discussion on aid. For the Bush Administration and the MCC, this realist perspective bore 
itself out in two ways: 1) A political balance was struck between realist notions of values and 
power through the use of aid; 2) Through a realist understanding of human nature, the MCC 
aid compacts were designed to engender governments ideal for future development. This two-
pronged application helps discern patterns found in the case study and ultimately guide the 
remainder of this thesis in search for whether the MCC was successful as an aid agency.  
 
5.4 The Political balance between Values and Power 
The Bush Administration governed in a way that it dubbed “compassionate 
conservatism”. I suggest that this motto was brought to life through the foundations of the 
MCC. It is a perfect instance where the Bush Administration applied compassion through an 
ideologically conservative framework. The MCC is concerned with helping those in poverty 
(values), yet expects US tax expenditures to benefit the American people at the same time 
(power). This political balance is institutionalized in the MCC. The MCC's initial call for 
greater investments in people (through education and health care), and extensive evaluation of 
the rate of return from each investment reflects the tenants of realism.  Proponents of realism 
are cognizant of the moral significance of international political action. The MCC's 
commitment to moral principles can be seen through its direct investments in health and 
education and the Bush Administration’s call for recipient government to show the same 
willingness to invest in their people. This plan is consistent with the president's other health 
and educational investments in SSA. The Bush Administration has dedicated billions of 
dollars in making Africa a healthier, more educated continent. For instance, the President's 
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) dedicated $15 billion over 5 years towards the 
alleviation and eradication of AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis in targeted countries in Africa. 
The Bush Administration implemented programs geared towards ending hunger by providing 
African farmers with science, technology and market incentives. The Bush Administration 
gave hundreds of millions of dollars to provide clean water to the poor and tripled education 
funding for school buildings and academic supplies. These programs are in addition to 













health and education in select African countries. The Bush Administration emphasized the 
need to conduct foreign affairs with morals and values. On World AIDS Day 2008 President 
Bush said, “Around the world, we've also supported care for more than 10 million people 
affected by HIV, including more than four million orphans and vulnerable children. More than 
237,000 babies have been born HIV-free, thanks to the support of the American people for 
programs to prevent mothers from passing the virus on to their children” (The White House 
2008).  
 
At one time President Bush was convinced that foreign aid had no role in economic 
development. Old aid strategies were thought to, “impede democratic reform and encourage 
corruption” (The White House 2002).  In many instances, this may have been true. It is 
because of cases like this, the President and the MCC committed to give aid to countries that 
showed signs of good governance. The skepticism towards governments in developing 
countries can be traced back to the forefathers of realism and their general opinion of human 
nature. Authors like Thomas Hobbes and Niccolo Machiavelli had a general distrust towards 
men. Thomas Hobbes proposed that caution towards men is warranted in all kinds of 
situations.  
 
For the laws of nature (as justice, equity, modesty, mercy, and (in summe) doing to 
others, as we would be done to,) of themselves, without the terror of some power, to 
cause them to be observed, are contrary to our naturall passions, that carry us to 
partiality, pride, revenge and the like. And covenants without the sword, are but words, 
and of no strength to secure a man at all (Hobbes 1967). 
 
In a more pointed fashion, Machiavelli also writes about the nature of men. “For one 
can generally say this about men: they are ungrateful, fickle, simulators and deceivers, 
avoiders of danger, and greedy for gain” (Machiavelli, 2005).  It is general influences like 
these that shaped the MCC's outlook on the governments of developing countries. After all, 
governments are a collection of men, and men by nature tend to be untrustworthy, immoral 
and self-serving. In an effort to protect against human nature, the MCC made healthy 
governance a prerequisite for selection and focused aid on further improving governance. It is 
the checks and balances in a healthy government system that offers protection from the ills of 
human nature. For instance, civil liberties are an important part of a healthy government. 













opinion about the actions of their government – even if it is a dissenting opinion. Government 
accountability groups keep close watch over a government and bring injustices to the attention 
of the broader public. Judiciaries are kept separate and independent in a healthy government, 
so they may rule objectively. Another strategic difference in the MCC's concept of aid is 
based on the principle that each nation bears the responsibility for its own development.  This 
added level of responsibility gives countries ownership in development and works to subdue 
another element of human nature.  
 
The leanings of realism can be detected in the Bush Administration’s skepticism of 
human nature in developing governments. Overcoming human nature, or at least keeping it in 
check, allows for aid to make a positive impact on economic development. Eliminating 
destructive forces such as corruption and encouraging positive reforms such as civil liberties 
makes a government ripe for economic development, and spurred on by foreign aid.  
 
Initially, a realist approach to aid equates to first calling for good governance. The 
MCC funded principles of good governance in several instances in the case study. In 
Madagascar, the MCC funded a land tenure project that emphasized land titling and land 
ownership security. Land administration is a critical function of government and this aspect of 
governance needed improvement in Madagascar. In Zambia, curbing corruption was the 
priority. The government, having spent many years embroiled in corruption, was in need of 
reform and better governance. In this case the MCC funded a detailed plan that reduced 
opportunities for corruption. Both of these major MCC objectives in these two countries 
revolved around improving governance. This in turn will move the government closer to the 
type of government that engenders development. 
 
In the study of Cape Verde, Madagascar, and Zambia, more instances of investments 
in people can be found. The MCC focused much of its energy and funding on improving the 
lives of agrarian workers and ending hunger-related problems. In Cape Verde and 
Madagascar, the compact gives particular attention to educating farmers with improved 
techniques and introduced the agricultural sector to new, more productive technology. An 
extensive plan of agricultural demonstrations and training centers shows a commitment to 
educating a sector that is far behind modern techniques. Increasing agricultural 
productiveness will mean higher yields, and less hunger in these particular countries. Parts of 













the yield is sanitary and free from harmful insects or chemicals. Lesotho is a country where 
well over $100 million is being invested in the health of the people of that nation. MCC 
Lesotho is comprehensively assessing the needs of health clinics and making renovations and 
improvements where needed with MCC funds.  
  
I suggest that providing education among those in the agricultural sector and ensuring 
proper health care is available fulfills one side of Carr's political balance. It is clear that the 
Bush Administration’s motivations were not wholly a political power play.  Instead, the 
MCC’s actions were theoretically out of genuine moral concern for others no matter their 
relation or position.  The large investment in the health and education of Africa seems to 
suggest a strong commitment to morals. On the other side of the political balance, the MCC 
designed its investments to benefit the US. According to the MCC, the US is a clear 
beneficiary in the aid compact with Cape Verde, Madagascar and Zambia  
 
5.5 Aid for an Ideal Government 
The Bush Administration wholly subscribes to the idea that there is an ideal 
government for growth and development. This ideal government is made up of certain types 
of institutions that have been proven to engender development. Many of these institutions 
were discussed in Chapter 3 and include quality regulations, land rights and access to land, 
good trade policy, low inflation, and good fiscal policy. In effect, the MCC is structurally 
funding governments that give development a fighting chance. The ingredients of 
accountability, responsibility, transparency, and a healthy environment for the private sector 
are all mixed together to form a country primed for development. Prior to receiving aid, 
countries had to prove that they had decent levels of governance and sensible economic 
policies. After the MCC selected a country, it seems that the funds were again focused on 
good governance and economic reforms. This fact was found in multiple instances where 
funds narrowly centered on improving governance and liberalizing economic policy. The 
attitudes the MCC takes in these respects are clearly grounded in realism. An understanding of 
the realist perspective of human nature has lead the MCC to fund good governance, while the 
realist perspective of interests and power has lead the MCC to fund economic liberalization.     
If developing nations hope to exit their developing status, the Bush Administration felt 
that economic reforms were a critical component of the development plan. This attention to 













power are important tenants of realism. Moving developing nations towards economic policy 
that contain free market elements is beneficial to both the developing country and the US. Let 
us revisit the realist definition of power for further elaboration. Power comprises anything that 
establishes and maintains the control of one man over another man. In this case, economic 
prosperity means power for both the developing country and the US. This type of power need 
not be obtrusive or destructive. Instead, this type of power can be better understood as 
empowerment for this discussion on aid. Obviously, one could see how a nation’s increase in 
wealth can mean an increase in power. Through economic liberalization, it was the intention 
that the developing nation and the US may increase in wealth through free market economics. 
This is an ideologically conservative notion that the Bush Administration funded through the 
MCC. Through this plan, both the developing country and the US increased in wealth and 
power. This notion of wealth as power is played out in international trade. The Bush 
Administration sought to increase the power of the US by preconditioning aid on the 
liberalization of trade between the US and the developing country.  
 
Many economists will agree that international trade is not a zero-sum contest. Trade 
agreements between two countries benefit both involved. The much-debated North Atlantic 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) gives credence to the notion that uninhibited trade benefits 
all that participate. For instance, in the following years after NAFTA was passed, Canada, 
Mexico and the US saw economic gains as indicated by their growth in GDP (World Bank 
2009). Plenty of barriers exist in international trade. Tariffs, subsidies and excessive 
government regulations are just a few barriers that are present in international trade. With the 
understanding that free trade benefits all partner countries, it is easy to see why the Bush 
Administration made liberalization of markets a precondition for aid. In this situation, realism 
makes the politics of foreign aid intelligible once again. The President's push to liberalize 
developing economies can be explained by the realist principle of interest defined in terms of 
power. Max Weber emphasized the importance of interests when he wrote, “Interests 
(materials and ideal), not ideas, dominate directly the actions of men” (Weber 1963). Thomas 
Hobbes would agree that men are inclined towards power writing, “So that in the first place, I 
put for generall inclination of all mankind, a perpetuall and restlesse desire of power after 
power, that ceaseth onely in death” (Hobbes 1967). In realism it is certain that power is a 
motivator for men. I argue that an additional trading partner and another ally in general for the 
US with the prospects of added wealth and power is the driving force of the MCC's 













11, 2001, the Bush Administration has worked to make all foreign policy action a means to 
security for the US.  By giving large sums of money to countries in need, the US is in essence 
making new friends around the world and adding to its overall global power standing. 
 
The MCC promoted economic liberalization in vary obvious ways in all three 
countries in the case study. In Cape Verde, funds concentrated on developing the private 
sector by removing governmental restraints to private investments and through financial 
sector reforms. In Madagascar, the MCC promoted legal and regulatory reform in the 
financial sector making markets more free and credit more available. Considering the 
Zambian economy is commodity based and export driven, the MCC focused its funds and 
efforts on making it easier to export goods, to register a business, and to conduct trade. In all 
these cases the MCC used aid to directly fund reform with the ultimate goal being to 
transform these developing countries into ideal governments for future development. For 
further elaboration, I look to the first three countries to receive aid from the MCC in SSA. 
 
5.6 Cape Verde 
Cape Verde is a small island nation with a population of 518,600 and a GNI per capita 
of $2,430. It was colonized by the Portuguese in the 15
th
 Century and achieved independence 
in 1975.  Located off the West Coast of Africa in the Northern Atlantic Ocean it historically 
functioned as an important coaling and supply station for early traders and shippers. Cape 
Verde frequently experiences droughts making farming difficult. Droughts are a grave 
concern since the lack of water limits agricultural productivity and inhibit Cape Verde's rural 
economy. Geographically isolated and with virtually no natural resources, Cape Verde's 
economy is mostly service-oriented with commerce, transport, tourism and public services 
accounting for three fourths of GDP (CIA 2009).  
 
Cape Verde has a solid democratic record and continues to be one of Africa's most 
stable and consolidated democracies. Since 1992, Freedom House has assigned Cape Verde a 
combined score of 1.5 or better and quickly chosen by the MCC for reasons of good 
governance.  
 
The US and Cape Verde entered into a compact on October 2005 worth $110 million 













identified their priorities for achieving economic growth and poverty reduction. The 
implementation of the development plan is managed by and oversight for particular projects 
given to Cape Verdeans. The priorities identified resulted in a three-part solution: 
 
 Increase agricultural production 
 Increase integration of the internal market and reduce transportation costs 
 Develop the private sector (MCC 2009) 
 
As can be seen in Figure 22, these three programs formed the majority of the money 
dedicated in the compact. Currently, over $99 million of the $110 million compact has been 
allocated through contracts and commitments. Approximately $51.6 million has been 
disbursed through the programs mentioned in the previous paragraph. The program seems to 
focus on obstacles that may be slowing Cape Verde's ascension to the developed world. In the 




















5.6.1 Agricultural Production 
As a small island with a total landmass of approximately 4,000 square kilometers, land 
available for farming is limited. Agriculture is hindered by a severe lack of water in an already 
arid climate. As a solution Cape Verde proposed a water management and soil conservation 
project, an agribusiness development project, and a farmer credit project. The water and soil 
management plan is composed of numerous activities designed to increase agricultural 
production by slowing surface run off through the construction of walls, terraces, dikes, and 
the capture of water in reservoirs. The agribusiness development project seeks to increase 
agricultural production through the training of farmers in the technical and managerial aspects 
of new farming technology. The new technology allows for the delivery of water to 
traditionally dry land, and the diversification of production to crops that are more valuable. 
MCC funds have made credit available to Cape Verdean farmers allowing for the instillation 
of drip irrigation and conversion to more valuable crops. The plan should theoretically result 
in economic growth and greater agricultural production. 
 
With these types of investment systematically focused on increasing agricultural 
productivity, I would expect to see agriculture grow as a percentage of GDP. The design 
suggests that more water and better technology and techniques would be available to farmers. 
This, in turn, should grow the sector itself in relation to the total GDP. However, Cape Verde's 
agriculture as a percent of GDP shrunk nearly 17 percent from 2004-2008. This lack of 
progress is surprising considering three quarters of the $11 million dedicated to the project has 
already been spent. At this stage, it appears that the MCC was not able to achieve positive 
short-term agricultural growth and overcome numerous other obstacles associated with 
agricultural production.   
 
5.6.2 Infrastructure Improvements 
  As an island nation, Cape Verde is dependent on imports for survival, and fluctuations 
in the price of goods imported directly impact individual citizens. The MCC funds have 
worked to make the delivery and transportation of goods to the islands more efficient and 
productive. The infrastructure projects are twofold: 1) Upgrade and expand the port of Praia 
and; 2) Improve Cape Verde's network of roads and bridges. The port is inherently too small 
to support the growing commercial traffic, and its operational systems are outdated and in 
need of new technology. Cape Verde's road network lack connectivity and hinder mobility. 













ensure their functioning regardless of weather conditions. 
 
These types of infrastructure improvements that were funded by the MCC and 
implemented by MCC Cape Verde should improve the trade logistics environment of Cape 
Verde. These logistical improvements should directly influence the transportation costs 
associated with imports and exports. In theory, these cost savings should trickle down to the 
price of goods bought and sold by ordinary Cape Verdeans. Ultimately, these savings should 
contribute to the larger development of Cape Verde.    
 
5.6.3 Private Sector Development 
Since Cape Verde has a strong record of good governance and stability, wealthy 
countries have been willing to maintain large contributions of development aid, which 
amounts to 25% of its overall GDP. Like many other sub-Saharan African countries, Cape 
Verde has become dependent on aid to fund the functioning of the government instead of tax-
revenues. The MCC intends to curtail aid dependency and move Cape Verde towards self-
sustaining private sector growth. To accomplish this, the plan works to mobilize investment 
by removing obstacles and eliminating preventable risk, and improves access to financial 
services.  
 
Although only around $2 million dollars were allocated for the project, the associated 
indicators saw the greatest growth under the private sector development project. Both foreign 
direct investment flows and exports of goods and services increased significantly. This 
program may have possibly been successful in removing barriers to business and attracted 
investors from abroad by improving the overall investment climate.   
 
5.7 Madagascar 
Madagascar is a mostly rural nation with a population of nearly 19.5 million people 
located off the South Eastern coast of Africa in the Indian Ocean. It is a poor country with a 
GNI per capita of only $320. One forth of the country’s GDP is rooted in agriculture, which 
employs 80% of the population (CIA 2009). The remaining GDP components are mostly 
composed of service and industry making up 58 percent and 15 percent respectively.  
 













1896. Just over a half a century later, Madagascar gained independence and entered into a 
seventeen-year period of single party rule. Since achieving independence, Madagascar’s 
experience with democracy has been versatile and troublesome. For instance, in 1997, a 
former Malagasy president during the 1970s (a leader with authoritarian tendencies) was 
returned to power. In a later, hotly contested presidential election, half the country nearly 
succeeded in opposition to the election results. Most recently, Madagascar experienced a coup 
d´e tat that overthrew the democratically elected president and replaced him with the mayor of 
Madagascar's capitol city, Antananarivo. Since 1992, Madagascar has averaged a Freedom 
House combined score of 3 and classified as a country that is partly free. However, 
Madagascar's Freedom House score is expected to suffer in the future because of the recent 
coup d´e tat in 2009.  
 
The US and Madagascar entered into a compact in April 2005 worth $110 million 
dollars over a period of five years. The compact was drafted by the citizens of Madagascar 
and identified their priorities for achieving economic growth and poverty reduction. The 
implementation of the development plan is managed by and overseen for particular projects 
given to the Malagasy. The priorities identified resulted in a three-part solution: 
 
 Increase land titling and land security 
 Increase competition in the financial sector 
 Improve agricultural production technologies and market capacity in rural areas 
(MCC 2009) 
 
As can be seen in Figure 23, these three programs formed the majority of the money dedicated 
in the compact. Currently, over $84 million of the $110 million compact has been allocated 
through contracts and commitments. Approximately $70.1 million has been disbursed through 
the programs previously mentioned. The program should logically lead to development and 
poverty eradication. In the following paragraphs, I will discuss these objectives and their 















      Figure 23: MCC Madagascar Obligations by Project (MCC 2009) 
 
5.7.1 Land Tenure 
Since the country that is mostly rural, Madagascar identified land ownership rights as 
an area in need of reform. At the time when the compact was initiated, Madagascar's land 
tenure system was rank with insecurity and inefficiency and was generally distrusted by its 
citizens. The objective of the project was to increase land titling and land security and 
improve land administration services. To accomplish this, the MCC took a three-pronged 
approach. 1) The National Land Policy Framework was formalized and reinforced with 
stronger legal recognition of land tenure, procedures, documents, and techniques. 2) Property 
rights were protected (through titling and certification), existing disputes resolved, and 
transaction costs reduced through improved government efficiency. 3) Additional employees 
were hired to assist with land administration services.  
 
Securing private property rights is an important initial step towards development. In 
his book The Wealth and Poverty of Nations, David Landes recognizes this as an important 
step for a government interested in growth and development (Landes 1999). When a country 
lacks the basic right to own and derive an income from personally owned land, conflict, 
confusion and poverty are often experienced. However, an early assessment in June 2006 of 













impact on growth. The study found that, “Titling has correspondingly small impacts on land 
productivity and land values” (Jacoby & Minten 2006). A later assessment is not available. 
 
5.7.2 Finance Sector Improvements 
Through various financial assessments, it was identified that in Madagascar domestic 
savings were low and the cost of credit was high, which presented a severe obstacle to 
development. The goals of the finance sector improvement activities included increasing 
efficiency, reducing risk, improving creditworthiness, and introducing greater competition 
among banks. With these improvements, the financial sector can aid in development on many 
levels. A banking system plays a critical role in development. Banks serve as intermediaries to 
transfer savings from people to others who need to borrow. Without these lines of credit, 
business activities are limited and development is hindered. This program has shown positive 
results as noted by the World Bank in September 2009. It showed that Madagascar was 
improving in the Do Business Ranking 2010 by dropping ten places from 144 to 134 out of 
183 countries (World Bank 2009). 
 
5.7.3 Agricultural Business Investments 
All but 20 percent of Malagasy citizens work in agriculture related professions. The 
Malagasy National Agricultural Master Plan is focused on assisting farmers with the transition 
from subsistence farming to market agriculture. Much of the rural population remains 
impoverished, because agricultural productivity is low and the crop proceeds are meager. The 
MCC’s solution to this problem is centered on various investments in agricultural business. In 
particular, the project seeks to improve farmer’s planting choices, teach farmers management 
and financial skills, introduce new technologies into the agricultural sector, and make credit 
more readily available to farmers. Logically, a program with this intent and of this scale 
should increase agriculture as a percentage of GDP. However, agriculture as a percentage of 
GDP has shrunk 10 percent since the inception of the MCC Madagascar agricultural business 
investment project (World Bank 2009).   
 
5.8 Zambia 
Zambia is a landlocked country in Southern Africa with a population of 11.6 million 
people and a GNI per capita of $490 (World Bank 2009). Formerly encompassed in an area 













became a republic in 1964. For much of its independent history, corruption has plagued the 
government and weakened chances for development. Recently, a task force prosecuted four 
cases of corruption among senior members of previous administration finding them liable for 
$41 million (CIA 2009).  
 
Cooper continues to be a prominent source of revenue for many Zambians. These 
mines were made more profitable through privatization, and quickly began to spur economic 
growth. Beginning in the 1990's, Zambia began to implement sensible economic policies, 
managed to curb inflation, and stabilize its currency improving economic growth as a whole. 
From 2005-2008, Zambia has experienced 6% GDP growth per year (World Bank 2009).   
 
The United States and Zambia entered into an agreement in 2005 worth $22.7 million 
dollars over a period of two years. The agreement was drafted by the citizens of Zambia and 
identified their priorities for achieving economic growth and poverty reduction. Zambians 
oversee the implementation of the development plan. Zambia's grant is slightly different from 
Cape Verde and Madagascar's grants in that it is smaller and focuses on matters of governance 
in addition to economic factors. Furthermore, the MCC selected Zambia to participate in a 
program dubbed a threshold program. The MCC has implemented dozens of these programs 
to help countries improve lagging policy indicators. In theory, the threshold program 
improves these indicators and qualifies it for a grant that is considerably larger in size with a 
clearer emphasis on economic growth. Since the threshold program is an integral part of the 
overall MCC program, it is important to evaluate its contributions to development. The 
priorities identified in the program resulted in a three-component solution: 
 
 Prevent corruption in government institutions 
 Improve effectiveness of public services 
 Improve border management of trade (MCC 2009) 
 
As can be seen in Figure 24, 100 percent of the funds were dedicated to these three projects in 
the program. The entire $22.7 million has been disbursed and the program has been 
completed. The program focused on obstacles that were slowing Zambia’s development. In 
the following paragraphs, I will discuss in depth these objectives and whether they lead to 














Figure 24: MCC Zambia Obligations by Project (MCC 2009) 
 
5.8.1 Corruption Reduction 
Zambia’s recent history is riddled with corruption and government misdoings. In 2004, 
it earned a disappointing -.86 on a scale ranging from -2.5 to 2.5 on the World Bank Indicator 
of control of corruption (World Bank Governance Indicators 2009). This widespread 
corruption was interpreted by the MCC as an impediment to economic and democratic 
growth. The anti-corruption plan tailored by the MCC and Zambia include measures such as 
reducing opportunities for administrative corruption, building the capacity of Zambia's anti-
corruption commission, and establishing internal watchdog units inside several government 
institutions (MCC 2009). This program sought to stamp out corruption and enabled 
development to take place. From the MCC’s perspective, corruption was diminished enough 
to qualify Zambia for a full compact worth many more millions of dollars. Improvements in 
the control of corruption have, indeed, been lessoned. According to the World Bank 
governance indicator of control of corruption, Zambia improved its score by .42 points. This 
component of the MCC program has seemed to been successful from both the MCC and 
















5.8.2 Public Service Improvements 
The Zambian bureaucracy is thick and filled with unnecessary red tape and 
administrative challenges. The MCC is working to establish the Zambian Development 
Agency that will act as a solution center for investors and business people. Through this new 
agency, administrative barriers will be removed, and the private sector will be integrated into 
the national plan for economic growth. With a simplified regulatory process and less 
bureaucracy, investors and businesses are more likely to choose to do business in Zambia.   
 
5.8.3 Removal of Trade Barriers 
The Heritage Foundations 2004 economic freedom index, which considers barriers to 
trade, scored Zambia with a 56.6 out of a perfect 100. Trade barriers such as tariffs raise the 
prices of imports making goods more costly and reduce competition. All trade barriers are 
harmful for the consumer and inhibit economic growth. The MCC is working to open 
Zambia's markets to freer trade by lowering existing trade barriers. By establishing a 
“Comprehensive Integrated Tariff System”, border related fees and services are controlled by 
one agency, therefore streamlining and cheapening border control and management. It is 
estimated that this new agency will reduce the number of days to export products from 60 to 
30 and the number of days to import products from 62 to 30 (MCC 2009). 
 
Zambia has the unfortunate neighbors of Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, which complicates access to shipping ports for exports such as copper. As noted in the 
literature review, geography can present many dangers to growth. In Zambia's case, it is 
landlocked with uncooperative or severely poor neighbors. Trade and exports are critically 
important to Zambia's commodity-based economy.  The World Bank logistics performance 
index, which measures the logistical ease of a country rated Zambia a 2.37 out of a perfect 5. 
This score is comparative to the mean score throughout SSA of 2.37 suggesting that the 
overall logistics of trade, border and customs included, is still in need of improvement.  
 
5.9 Qualitative Reasoning for Empirical Results 
Throughout the empirical analyses, Cape Verde and Zambia performed relatively 
better than other Sub-Saharan African countries, while Madagascar lagged behind. Cape 
Verde and Zambia seem to respond to the incentive, monitoring, and size of aid with 













among both indicators.  A close look at the particular aid activities in each country provides 
some reasoning to Cape Verde and Zambia’s success and Madagascar’s relative failure. 
 
In the cases of Cape Verde and Zambia, both compacts involved elements that focused 
on opening markets and improving international trade – an element that was missing in 
Madagascar’s compact. Cape Verde focused funds on improving capacity at its international 
port and developing the private sector to attract overseas investment. Zambia focused a 
quarter of its MCC aid on improving border management and reducing trade barriers. 
Madagascar’s compact was void of any trade related component. Instead, aid was used to 
improve domestic farming techniques and land ownership. Madagascar’s situation further 
deteriorated as political unrest grew ultimately ending in a coup d'e tat in 2009. The political 





































This thesis set out to deliver a true assessment of the MCC. Throughout the study, both 
quantitative and qualitative methods have been used to gauge whether or not aid administered 
by the MCC has lead to economic and democratic development. Answering this question is 
pivotal in deciding the direction of the MCC and other aid related programs.  The empirical 
findings of this thesis suggest that aid disbursed by the MCC is positively impacting 
development only slightly. Through qualitative research, it was learned that the MCC focused 
funds on trade leading to greater growth in Cape Verde and Zambia. Further research showed 
that the MCC is having relatively large success in creating ideal governments for future 
development. This leaves us with an obvious question; was the MCC successful in impacting 
economic and democratic development?  Did the MCC model for disbursing aid lead to 
development? This is a complex question with many variables in consideration and warrants 
more than a simple yes or no answer.  As noted in the literature review, there are vast 
differences in opinion as to whether aid actually works.  The findings of this essay do not 
allow us to champion the Bush Administration’s aid strategy as a tool for short-term poverty 
eradication and democratic expansion.   
 
While the findings were inconclusive, one can better understand the motivation for aid 
through the theory of political realism. Through the application of realism we can see the 
theoretical basis for the Bush Administration’s international political actions. I assert that 
realist principles such as human nature, values and interests were taken into consideration 
when assigning aid to developing states.  Realism’s skepticism for human nature led the US to 
a call for healthy governance; realism’s emphasis on values lead the US to show concern for 
other’s health and education; realism’s assertion that men are inclined towards power led the 
US to precondition aid according to market liberalization. 
 
It is hoped that the discussions presented in this essay will cause hesitation in those 
who think simply more foreign aid is needed to rescue the poor and undemocratic. A complex 
problem such as poverty or an elusive concept such as democracy is not likely to have simple 
solutions. Transfer of wealth from rich states to the poor may not change matters. I suggest 
that it will take a deeper solution – one that may be out of the reach of aid planners. Although 













administration’s moral decision to care for the sick and uneducated is important and altogether 
meaningful. It is hoped that the contents of this essay will increase discussion and debate on 
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Appendix A: World Bank Country Codes 
 




Burkina Faso BFA 
Burundi BDI 
Cameroon CMR 
Cape Verde CPV 
Central African Republic CAF 
Chad TCD 
Comoros COM 
Congo, Dem. Rep. ZAR 
Congo, Rep. COG 
Cote d'Ivoire CIV 






















Sao Tome and Principe STP 
Senegal SEN 
Seychelles SYC 
















Appendix A: World Bank Country Codes (Continued) 
 
Country Name Country Code 
Somalia SOM 



















































Appendix B: SSA Gross National Income per capita 2004-2008 
 
Country  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
AGO 910 1320 1910 2590 3450 
BEN 490 550 570 610 690 
BWA 4370 5340 5650 6100 6470 
BFA 340 400 420 430 480 
BDI 90 100 110 120 140 
CMR 810 920 980 1050 1150 
CPV 1720 2040 2360 2680 3130 
CAF 290 320 340 370 410 
TCD 330 410 460 510 530 
COM 550 650 670 690 750 
ZAR 110 120 130 140 150 
COG 880 1110 1440 1510 1970 
CIV 720 820 840 880 980 
GNQ 3250 5210 6870 9710 14980 
ERI 150 180 210 270 300 
ETH 140 160 190 220 280 
GAB 3990 5120 5300 6450 7240 
GMB 260 270 290 330 390 
GHA 380 450 520 600 670 
GIN 420 420 400 390 * 
GNB 160 190 210 220 250 
KEN 460 520 580 660 770 
LSO 650 810 960 1040 1080 
LBR 110 120 120 150 170 
MDG 300 310 300 340 410 
MWI 220 220 230 250 290 
MLI 390 450 460 560 580 
MRT 530 600 760 840 .. 
MUS 4670 5250 5460 5610 6400 
MYT * * * * * 
MOZ 260 290 310 340 370 
NAM 2780 3400 3900 4100 4200 
NER 220 250 270 280 330 
NGA 530 620 830 970 1160 
RWA 220 250 290 330 410 
STP * 760 840 920 1020 
SEN * * 800 870 970 
SYC 8240 9680 10740 11060 10290 
SLE 220 230 250 280 320 
 













Appendix B: Gross National Income per capita 2004-2008 (Continued) 
 
Country Code 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
SOM * * * * * 
ZAF 3630 4810 5420 5730 5820 
SDN 490 590 740 910 1130 
SWZ 1620 2260 2360 2550 2520 
TZA 310 350 370 400 440 
TGO 320 350 370 370 400 
UGA 280 300 340 370 420 
ZMB 400 500 600 740 950 
ZWE 590 360 * * * 
 
Source: World Bank (2009) 















































Appendix C: SSA Freedom House Scores 2004-2008 
 
Year    2004     2005     2006     2007     2008   
  PR CL  Status PR CL  Status PR CL  Status PR CL  Status PR CL  Status 
AGO 6 5 NF 6 5 NF 6 5 NF 6 5 NF 6 5 NF 
BEN 2 2 F 2 2 F 2 2 F 2 2 F 2 2 F 
BWA 2 2 F 2 2 F 2 2 F 2 2 F 2 2 F 
BFA 5 4 PF 5 3 PF 5 3 PF 5 3 PF 5 3 PF 
BDI 5 5 PF 3 5 PF 4 5 PF 4 5 PF 4 5 PF 
CMR 6 6 NF 6 6 NF 6 6 NF 6 6 NF 6 6 NF 
CAF 6 5 NF 5 4 PF 5 4 PF 5 4 PF 5 5 PF 
CPV 1 1 F 1 1 F 1 1 F 1 1 F 1 1 F 
TCD 6 5 NF 6 5 NF 6 6 NF 7 6 NF 7 6 NF 
COM 4 4 PF 4 4 PF 3 4 PF 4 4 PF 3 4 PF 
ZAR 5 4 PF 5 5 PF 6 5 NF 6 5 NF 6 5 NF 
COG 6 6 NF 6 6 NF 5 6 NF 5 6 NF 6 6 NF 
CDI 6 6 NF 6 6 NF 7 6 NF 7 5 NF 7 5 NF 
GNQ 7 6 NF 7 6 NF 7 6 NF 7 6 NF 7 7 NF 
ERI 7 6 NF 7 6 NF 7 6 NF 7 6 NF 7 6 NF 
ETH 5 5 PF 5 5 PF 5 5 PF 5 5 PF 5 5 PF 
GAB 5 4 PF 6 4 PF 6 4 PF 6 4 PF 6 4 PF 
GMB 4 4 PF 5 4 PF 5 4 PF 5 4 PF 5 4 PF 
GHA 2 2 F 1 2 F 1 2 F 1 2 F 1 2 F 
GIN 6 5 NF 6 5 NF 6 5 NF 6 5 NF 7 5 NF 
GNB 4 4 PF 3 4 PF 4 4 PF 4 4 PF 4 4 PF 
KEN 3 3 PF 3 3 PF 3 3 PF 4 3 PF 4 3 PF 
LSO 2 3 F 2 3 F 2 3 F 2 3 F 2 3 F 
LIB 5 4 PF 4 4 PF 3 4 PF 3 4 PF 3 4 PF 
MDG 3 3 PF 3 3 PF 4 3 PF 4 3 PF 4 3 PF 
MWI 4 4 PF 4 4 PF 3 4 PF 4 4 PF 4 4 PF 
MLI 2 2 F 2 2 F 2 3 F 2 3 F 2 3 F 
MRT 6 5 NF 6 4 PF 5 4 PF 4 4 PF 6 5 NF 
MOZ 3 4 PF 3 4 PF 3 4 PF 3 3 PF 3 3 PF 
NAM 2 3 F 2 2 F 2 2 F 2 2 F 2 2 F 
NIR 3 3 PF 3 3 PF 3 3 PF 3 4 PF 3 4 PF 
NGA 4 4 PF 4 4 PF 4 4 PF 4 4 PF 5 4 PF 
RWA 6 5 NF 6 5 NF 6 5 NF 6 5 NF 6 5 NF 
STP 2 2 F 2 2 F 2 2 F 2 2 F 2 2 F 
SEN 2 3 F 2 3 F 2 3 F 2 3 F 3 3 PF 
SYC 3 3 PF 3 3 PF 3 3 PF 3 3 PF 3 3 PF 
SLE 4 3 PF 4 3 PF 4 3 PF 3 3 PF 3 3 PF 
SOM 6 7 NF 6 7 NF 6 7 NF 6 7 NF 7 7 NF 
ZAF 1 2 F 1 2 F 2 2 F 2 2 F 2 2 F 
SDN 7 7 NF 7 7 NF 7 7 NF 7 7 NF 7 7 NF 
SWZ 7 5 NF 7 5 NF 7 5 NF 7 5 NF 7 5 NF 
TZA 4 3 PF 4 3 PF 4 3 PF 4 3 PF 4 3 PF 
TGO 6 5 NF 6 5 NF 6 5 NF 5 5 PF 5 5 PF 
UGA 5 4 PF 5 4 PF 5 4 PF 5 4 PF 5 4 PF 
ZMB 4 4 PF 4 4 PF 3 4 PF 3 4 PF 3 3 PF 
ZBW 7 6 NF 7 6 NF 7 6 NF 7 6 NF 7 6 NF 
 
Source: Freedom House (2009) 
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